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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s a crisis occurred in the medical malpractice insurance industry.  As
tort law began to favor plaintiffs, the number and severity of medical malpractice claims
increased.1 Insurance companies inundated with a deluge of claims correspondingly
increased their premiums or pulled out of the malpractice insurance industry all together.2
Some physicians were unable to obtain medical malpractice insurance and others were
faced with as much as a 300% rise in insurance premiums.3  As a result, the medical
profession urged states to enact medical malpractice tort reform.4 Some states’ tort
reform included legislation such as award caps, collateral source offset, and the
enactment of more stringent and shorter statutes of limitation and repose.5
Statutes of limitation date back to early Roman law.6 The first statute of
limitations appeared in English jurisprudence with the enactment of the Limitation Act of
1623.7 During the late nineteenth century, American courts accepted statutes of limitation
as vital to societal welfare because they put defendants on notice to defend against suits
within a reasonable period, before claims grew stale and memories dim by the passage of
                                                
1 DAVID W. LOUISELL &HAROLD WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE §20.01 3 (1999).
2 Id.
3 Patricia M. Danzon, The Effects of Tort Reforms on the Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice
Claims, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 413 (1987).
4 James, et al v. Phoenix General Hospital, et al, 154 Ariz. 594, 744 P.2d 695, 700 (1987).
5Danzon, supra note 3, at 2.
6 Andrea C. Rodgers & John A. Parkins, Jr., Recent Developments in Delaware Case Law, 3 Del. L. Rev.
253, 254 (2000).
7 Id.
2time.8 While many courts were well aware of the conditions in the 1970s that spawned
reform in statutes of limitation and repose, they yet chafed under the draconian effect of
the new legislation.9  Courts were faced with extinguishing, on motions for summary
judgment, the valid claims of injured plaintiffs based on an arbitrary number.
Courts are uncomfortable with the inherently arbitrary character of statutes of
limitation and repose.10 As some scholars have observed, “Evidence does not deteriorate
overnight, and society’s interest in promoting repose is only marginally greater on day
two than it was on day one.”11  Justice Jackson once stated, “Their operation does not
discriminate between the just and the unjust claim, or the voidable or unavoidable delay.
They have come into the law not through judicial process but through legislation.”12
Consequently, many Courts found ways of construing statutes of limitation to favor
plaintiffs including varying interpretations of when such statutes of limitation accrue.  In
addition, Courts have adopted exceptions to these statutes such as the continuing
treatment doctrine, the foreign object exception, and discovery rules among others. As
Horace G. Wood, a 19th century proponent of statutes of limitation stated:
Laws of limitation are to be encouraged; yet, as they are acts which take
away existing rights, they should always be construed with reasonable
strictness, and in favor of the rights sought to be defeated thereby, so far as
is consistent with their letter and spirit.13
                                                
8 Rogers & Parkins, supra note 6, at 255.
9 Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28 Pac. L.J. 453
510 (1997).
10 Krusesky v. Baugh, 138 Cal. App.3d 834,835, 188 Cal. Rptr. 90, 95 (1976); See also, GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 31 (1996) “Arbitrariness in the definition of
the laws violates our essential expectations in living under the rule of law.”
11 Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 9, at 511.
12 Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, et al., 325 U.S. 304, 314, 65 S. Ct. 1137, 1142 (1945).
13 1 HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS (4th ed. 1916).
3This paper addresses the history leading up to and including the tort reform of the
1970s and 1980s; the arguments for and against statutes of limitation and repose; the
points at which statutes of limitation may accrue or may be tolled; and compares the
various statutes of limitation and repose in several jurisdictions to the evolving
interpretation of Georgia’s statute of limitations and repose.
4CHAPTER 2
THE CYCLE OF CRISIS
The Insurance Crisis
Insurance premiums are, in part, a function of the severity and frequency of
claims.14 As plaintiffs bring more claims and the amount paid out on those claims
increases, insurance companies must charge higher premiums to cover the increased risk
of losses. Prior to the 1970s, medical malpractice insurance was relatively unimportant.
In the 1950s only one doctor in seven faced a medical malpractice claim from a patient
over the entirety of his career.15 In 1969, St. Paul Fire and Marine Company (St. Paul), a
leading malpractice carrier, recorded one claim for every twenty-three doctors they
insured.16   In 1974 the ratio rose to one claim in every ten doctors reflecting a significant
increase in the frequency of claims.17 St. Paul also reported a fifty-five percent increase in
claim frequency since 1980, from 10.5 claims per 100 physicians in 1980 to 16.3 claims
per 100 physicians in 1983.18 According to a study performed by Patricia Danzon, a
leading scholar in the field, the average annual growth rate of claim frequency per
physician is fourteen percent per annum.19
                                                
14 PATRCIA DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 60-69, 90 (1985).
15 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 2-3.
16 TARKY LOMBARDI, JR., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE A LEGISLATOR’S VIEW 11 (1978).
17 Id.
18LOMBARDI, supra note 16, at 11.
19 Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 49 Law & Cont. Probs.
57 (Spring 1986).
5The severity of claims also increased.  The average claim paid in 1969 by St. Paul
was $6,075.00.20 But by 1974, the average claim paid rose to $12,534.00, more than
twice the average amount paid in 1969.21 According to one source, the average medical
malpractice award rose from $404,726 in 1980 to $1,478,028.00 by 1986.22 Claims can
be especially severe in birth related neurological injury cases. In one such 1989 case, the
jury awarded $10.7 million dollars.23 Danzon stated, “The average malpractice jury
award is reported to have risen from $404,726 in 1980 to $954,858 in 1984.24
Malpractice claim severity has risen approximately twice as fast as the Consumer Price
Index.25 As the number and severity of claims shot up, the cost of liability insurance
reflected the rise with a sharp increase in medical malpractice insurance premiums.26
 Premiums overall increased from 65 million in the 1960s to 330 million in
1970.27 Staggering premium increases occurred in certain medical specialties. For
example, surgeon’s medical malpractice insurance premium rates rose approximately
940% from 1960 to 1970.28  One study from Florida reported that the cost of a medical
malpractice policy in Dade and Broward Counties with limits of $1,000,000 per
occurrence and $3,000,000 aggregate, rose from $4,310 per year to $18,415 per year for
family practitioners; from $21,971 to $95,875 for general surgeons; and from $30,433 to
                                                
20 LOMBARDI, supra note 16, at 11.
21 Id.
22 Amanda E. Haiduc, A Tale of Three Damage Caps, 40 Case W. Res. 825, 827-828 (1990).
23 Scott v. United States, 884 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1989) upholding general validity of a $10.7 million award
including $2 million in noneconomic damages.
24 Danzon, supra note 19, at 57-58 reporting from a study by Jury Verdict Research, Inc.
25 Id. at 75.
26 LOMBARDI, supra note 16, at 11.
27 Id.
28 Thomas L. Stachler, Repose v. Right-To-A-Remedy, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 423, 425 (1988).
6$165,320 for obstetricians.29 Robinson reported, that from 1960 to 1972 the average
premium costs rose an estimated six hundred percent for specialties that were considered
low-risk and an average of nine hundred percent for high-risk specialties.30 Robinson
cautioned that these numbers are nationwide averages; some states experienced higher
rates of increase.31 In some areas the crisis was not one of rising premiums, but one of
availability as insurers fled the market entirely, leaving physicians without coverage.32
Practitioners panicked, threatening strikes and portending the collapse of the health care
system.33 During the mid-1970s the medical community applied fierce pressure to almost
all state legislatures to resolve the burgeoning crisis.34
The “insurance crisis” eventually culminated in a flurry of tort reform.35 As
Robinson stated, “The medical profession urged state legislatures across the country to
halt or reverse the liberalization trend by shoring up or imposing new constraints on
malpractice actions.”36 Almost all state legislatures responded to the crisis by
implementing various reforms in an attempt to reduce the number and amount of
malpractice awards, based upon the idea that by enacting the reforms insurance providers
would continue to provide coverage.37 Virtually all medical malpractice tort reform can
be seen as an attempt to address the increase in the frequency and/or severity of claims.
Many states modified applicable statutes of limitation as part of their tort reform
                                                
29 Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, Off to the Races: The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27
Hous. L. Rev. 207, 213 (1990).
30 Glen O Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970’s: A Retrospective, 49 Law & Cont. Prob.
5, 8 (Spring 1986).
31 Id.
32DANZON, supra note 14, at 2.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Sanders & Joyce, supra note 29, at 210-211.
36 Robinson, supra note 30, at 20.
7“package.”38 Reform in time-based limitations addresses both the frequency and severity
of claims.
Time-based limitations directly address the frequency of claims. They preclude
otherwise valid claims from being brought especially claims involving failure to diagnose
and those involving latent injuries.39  As Danzon suggested:
States that enacted shorter statutes of limitations and set outer limits on
discovery rules have had less growth in claim frequency than states with
statutes more lenient to plaintiffs. On average, cutting one year off the
statute of limitations for adults reduces claim frequency by eight percent.
The effect would presumably be greater for a reduction from, say, four to
three years than from ten to nine years.40
Additionally, statutes of limitation and repose may indirectly moderate the
severity of claims if many of the barred claims involve large damages. If plaintiffs are
barred from bringing high-damage malpractice suits by applicable statutes of limitation
and repose, insurance companies are spared from paying at least some high dollar claims.
For example, a 1993 case challenging the constitutionality of the five-year statute of
repose in the state of Georgia involved the misdiagnosis by a hospital pathologist of a
malignant melanoma, one of the most aggressive forms of cancer.41 The plaintiff, a
                                                                                                                                                
37 Stephen Zuckerman, et al, Information on Malpractice, 49 Law & Cont. Prob. 85, 101 (Spring 1986);
Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 499, 521-532 (1989)
Forty-nine states enacted tort reform.
38 Robinson, supra note 30, at 21.
39 Id. at 22.
40 Danzon, supra note 19, at 78.
41 Craven v. Lowndes County Hospital Authority, 263 Ga. 657, 437 S.E.2d 308 (1993).
8twenty-year-old man at the time of suit, would likely have recovered significant damages
if his case had not been barred by Georgia’s statute of repose.42
The Long Tail
Time limitations are a significant issue in tort reform because of the difficulties
insurance companies face in setting premiums when claims have a “long tail.”
The crux of the difficulty facing insurance companies is their inability to accurately
predict the cost and number of claims that are to be paid out each year.43 If an insurer
cannot predict the number and amount of losses in a given year, it does not know how
much to charge for premiums or set aside to preserve an adequate loss reserve fund.44
One of the main problems that insurers faced prior to the tort reform of the 1970s was the
“long tail” caused by the delay in the development and bringing of claims resulting from
characteristically long statutes of limitation applied to medical malpractice suits.45
Raymond Bohl, then Vice President of the Special Accounts division of Wausau
Insurance stated, “In no other area is there so great a lag between the date of the act or
omission for which a claim is made and the date of final disposition… This time lag is
called the ‘tail’ of malpractice coverage.”46
A medical malpractice claim on average reaches its final disposition in 123
months from the date of the act or omission for which the claim is made as compared to
an automobile accident claim, which is resolved on average in 63 months.47 As Bovbjerg
stated, “Once filed, claims average twenty-five months to close, and sixteen percent
                                                
42 Id.
43 Stachler, supra note 28, at 425.
44 Id.
45 James, 154  Ariz. at 16.
46 LOMBARDI, supra note 16, at 6.
47 Id.
9average more than five years to adjudicate.”48 This “long-tail” of medical malpractice
cases may explain why much of the tort reform of the 1970s specifically targeted medical
malpractice claims. In their 1974 position paper, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance
Company stated, “For our all-time liability from 1974 professional services of our
insured doctors, we collected a premium once in 1974. But we’ll pay claims under
tomorrow’s unknown law and in tomorrow’s unknown social climate with tomorrow’s
dollars.”49 Longer statutes of limitation increase the cost of liability insurance.50 A delay
in defending and paying additional claims from older occurrences increases the need for
capital because the insurer must not only pay the normal rate of return on a risk-free
investment, but must also set aside a “risk premium” because of the variability of
expected future claims.51
Prior to 1975, a large number of states had statutes of limitation that allowed a
claim to be filed up to twenty-one years after the event in suits involving the injury of a
newborn.52 Additionally, many states had “discovery rules” which tolled the statute of
limitations until the point at which the plaintiff discovered that they had been injured by a
medical practitioner’s negligence.53 Such discovery rules, without any statutes of repose,
presented insurance companies with a potentially unlimited tail and little predictability.
It is therefore understandable that one of the first lines of reform after the insurance crisis
of the 1970s was the reduction of statutes of limitation and the imposition or shortening
of statutes of repose.
                                                
48 Bovbjerg, supra note 37, at 507-508.
49 Id. at 12.
50 Randall R. Bovbjerg & Joel M. Schumm, Indiana’s Statute of Limitations for Medical Practitioners, 31
Ind. L. Rev. 1051, 1058-1059 (1998).
51 Id.
52 LOMBARDI, supra note 16, at 34-35.
53 Bovbjerg & Schumm, supra note 50, at 1065.
10
Defining Statutes of Limitation and Repose
The term “statute of limitations”, according to one scholar, “refers to a legislative
enactment, or codification thereof, that sets forth a limitation period.”54 Statutes of
limitation are different from statutes of repose. Statutes of limitation circumscribe the
time for bringing a claim after it accrues, while a statute of repose limits the time that a
claim can accrue in the first place.55 A statute of repose defines a time limitation after the
defendant’s wrongful act that a claim must accrue or be barred.56 According to the
Georgia Supreme Court, statutes of limitation differ from statutes of repose in that:
A statute of limitations is a procedural rule limiting the time in which a
party may bring an action for a right which has already accrued. [While] a
statute of ultimate repose delineates a time period in which a right may
accrue.  If the injury occurs outside that period, it is not actionable.57
For example, if a state has a statute of limitations that allows a plaintiff to bring suit
within two years after the discovery of an injury caused by a defendant’s negligence, yet
the state has a five-year statute of ultimate repose, should a plaintiff discover her injury
five years and one day from the date of the defendant’s negligent treatment, her claim is
forever barred and she will recover nothing. The reform of statutes of limitation and
repose in the 1970s did much to shorten the tail confronted by insurance companies.
Despite these time limitation reforms and other remedial statutes enacted during the
1970s, yet another cycle of crisis occurred in the 1980s triggering a second round of tort
reform.
                                                
54 Eli J. Richardson, Eliminating the Limitations of Limitations Law, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 1015, 1018 (1997).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Craven, 263 Ga. at 264 (emphasis added).
11
The Continuing Cycle of Crisis
The problem, in the 1980s, did not appear to be primarily a product of availability
of insurance since many physicians and hospitals founded their own insurance companies
in response to the previous crisis of the 1970s.58 The crisis in the mid-1980s was one of
rapidly rising insurance premiums.59 A task force operating under the Department of
Justice issued a report stating that “developments in tort law” were the main cause of
steeply increasing insurance premiums.60 Some, however, began to doubt that the
insurance crisis of the 1980s resulted from problems within the tort law system. Sanders
and Joyce reported:
In 1984, the insurance industry began a campaign in which it placed most
of the blame [for the crisis] at the feet of the tort law system. By 1986, the
Insurance Information Institute was reportedly spending six and one-half
million dollars on advertising and other efforts to tie the insurance crisis to
the need for tort reform.61
Sloan and others have suggested that for the past 50 years a pattern has been
established in the insurance industry.62 Some have suggested that since the 1950s there
may have been as many as four cycles of crisis in the medical malpractice insurance
industry.63 During these cycles, insurance companies state that they have inadequate
                                                
58 Id., See also, F. Patrick Hubbard, The Physician’s Point of View Concerning Medical Malpractice, 23
Ga. L. Rev. 295, 297 (1989).
59 Id.
60 Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of the Current
Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability, Feb. 1986 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 1986-491-
510:40090).
61 Sanders & Joyce, supra note 29, at 214.
62FRANK A. SLOAN, ET AL., INSURING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 42 (1991).
63 Id. at 43.
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funds and must therefore raise insurance premiums or threaten to withdraw from the
market all together.64 According to one economics scholar:
The industry has a pattern of alternating between soft markets
characterized by stable premiums and low rates of return to insurers and
periodic tight markets with high premiums and returns. From about 1977
until 1985, the industry was in a soft market with declining returns, which
was preceded by a tight market in the mid-1970s, which in turn was
preceded by a soft market since the late 1960s.65
 Theories regarding the cause of this pattern of crisis include a need for insurance
companies to recoup money on bad investments, competition between oligopolistic
insurers, and errors in forecasting anticipated losses.66 Some have suggested that
underwriting losses from bad investments and the downturn in the economy may have
been the cause of both crises. 67 Eugene Pavilon, past president of the Association of
Trial Lawyers of America stated, “There never was a liability crisis…What happened
was there was a crisis of insurance that was foisted upon the country by the insurance
industry to make up for their own misjudgments in business.”68 Other critics of the crisis
asserted that insurance companies derived unwarranted profits from unduly high
premiums, which were needed, in part, because of poor investments.69 Bovbjerg pointed
out that in the early 1970s “insurers’ investment earnings unexpectedly fell because of
                                                
64 Id.
65 Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets, 5 Yale J. on
Reg. 455 (1988).
66 Id.
67 Zuckerman, supra note 37, at 93; Sanders & Joyce, supra note 29, at 214-215; and Robinson, supra note
30, at 6.
68 Sanders & Joyce, supra note 29, at 215.
69 Howard A. Lerner, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes, 18 Harv. J. on Legis. 143,
145 (1981).
13
the first oil crisis and the decline in the stocks and bonds market.”70 Posner has suggested
that premiums in a competitive market decrease when interest rates increase
independently of the cost of claims.71 Some asserted, therefore, that the rise in premiums
in the 1980s partially resulted from falling interest rates.72
Sloan concluded that the legal reforms of the 1970s were ineffective.73 He posited
that the final objective of malpractice reform is lowering premium levels – which in an
open market reflect claims frequency and severity.74 Sloan found no significant effects on
premium rates among fourteen different pro-defendant legal reforms, which lowered
either the frequency or severity of malpractice claims.75 His somewhat bottom-line study
seems to indicate that some other factor than the frequency and severity of malpractice
claims was driving the crisis of the 1970s as well as the 1980s. Learner commented on
the efficacy of tort reform stating, “Despite the widespread legislative enactments,
insurance premiums have continued to increase.76
State legislatures generally enacted less severe reforms in the 1980s in response to
the “crisis” than they had in the 1970s. They, however, enacted more inclusive reforms,
sweeping in all personal injury torts.77 A few reforms such as those adopted in Florida
and Virginia departed from traditional tort principals and adopted “no fault” systems for
                                                
70 Bovbjerg, supra note 48, at 504.
71 James R. Posner, Trends in Medical Malpractice Insurance, 49 Law & Cont. Probs. 37, 48 (Spring
1986).
72 Hubbard, supra note 58, at 305-306.
73 Frank A. Sloan, State Responses to the Medical Malpractice Insurance “Crisis” of the 1970s, 9 J.
Health, Pol’y, Pol. & L. 629, 643 (1985).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 639-642.
76 Learner, supra note 69, at 148.
77 SLOAN, supra note 62, at 1056.
14
handling infant neurological injuries sustained at birth.78 Whatever the impetus behind
the continued insurance crises, the debate between plaintiffs and their lawyers and
physicians and their insurers continue today, with the former arguing the need of injured
plaintiffs to be compensated for their injuries resulting from medical malpractice, while
the latter argue the need of insurers and physicians to adequately predict the number and
severity of malpractice suits.79 The next chapter will address the competing interests of
both parties with regard to time limitations.
                                                
78 Id., See also, Thomas R. Tedcastle & Marvin A. Dewar, Medical Malpractice: A New Treatment For An
Old Illness, 16 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 535, 584-586 (1988).
79 Bovbjerg & Schumm, supra note 50, at 1056.
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CHAPTER 3
BALANCING INTERESTS
Given the extinguishing effects of statutes of limitation and repose on plaintiffs’
claims, it would seem worthwhile to examine the various policies supporting or
disfavoring such time limitations. This chapter will address these policies both in terms of
the defendant’s interests and the plaintiff’s interests.
The Defendant’s Interest
Ochoa and Wistrich suggested that statutes of limitation promote repose, not in
the sense that the word “repose” is used in the term “statute of repose”, but in its broadest
sense.80 They identified four overlapping concepts of repose which included peace of
mind, avoiding disruption of settled expectations, reducing an uncertain future, and
reducing the costs of uncertainty.81 The concept of repose as peace of mind is a fairly
straightforward one. If a physician knows that she no longer need worry about a potential
malpractice claim after a specific period of time, she naturally experiences peace of mind.
The other three concepts identified by Ochoa and Wistrich are, however, less obvious.
The California Supreme Court described statutes of limitation as “giving security
and stability to human affairs.”82 Statutes of limitation avoid disrupting settled
expectations by maintaining the status quo.83 Regardless, of how the law arose the
                                                
80 Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 9, at 460.
81 Id.
82 Guiterrez v. Mofid, 39 Cal.3d 892, 899, 705 P.2d 886, 890 (1985).
83 Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 9, at 464.
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physician knows she can rely on it and her acquisition of rights by the lapse of time.84
Statutes of limitation additionally promote repose by reducing uncertainty about the
future.  As one state Supreme Court acknowledged, “The subsidiary aim of the statute of
limitations [is] promptly to resolve disputes in order that commercial and other activities
can continue unencumbered by the threat of litigation.”85 Uncertainty about the potential
of future claims can adversely affect the business decisions and transactions of
defendants and may adversely affect societal resources by inhibiting new business
ventures.86 The final aspect of repose proposed by Ochoa and Wistrich is the reduction of
the direct costs associated with uncertainty of claims.87 This cost is exemplified by the
price of purchasing malpractice insurance and the increasing premiums attendant to the
uncertainty of long-tail claims.88
In addition to promoting repose, statues of limitation also affect the evidentiary
aspects of medical malpractice. Courts recognize that over time memories grow dim and
as a result testimony may be less reliable.89 Evidence may deteriorate or be destroyed and
witnesses become unavailable.90 Thus, accurate fact-finding is compromised and the
appropriate adjudication of claims hindered. The U.S. Supreme Court reflected this
concern when it stated:
The process of discovery and trial which results in the finding of ultimate
facts for or against the plaintiff by the judge or jury is obviously more
reliable if the witness or testimony in question is relatively fresh. Thus in
                                                
84 Id.
85 Elkins v. Derby, 12 Cal.3d 410, 417, 525 P.2d 81, 86 (1974).
86 Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 9, at 466.
87 Id. at 468-469.
88 Id.
89 Cox v. Upjohn Co., 913 S.W. 2d 225, 231 (Tex. App. 1995); See also, Ackerman v. Price Waterhouse,
644 N.E. 2d 1009, 1012 (N.Y. 1994).
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the judgment of most legislatures and courts, there comes a point at which
the delay of a plaintiff in asserting a claim is sufficiently likely either to
impair the accuracy of the fact-finding process or to upset settled
expectations that a substantive claim will be barred without respect to
whether it is meritorious.91
The rate at which evidence deteriorates has not been empirically proven, yet our intuition
and experience tell us that given enough time, both evidence and memory become less
reliable. The passage of time seems to improve only one area of tort law and that is the
ascertainment of future damages. Ochoa and Wistrich pointed out that “it is generally
more difficult to predict the future than to reconstruct the past.”92
Additional policies behind statutes of limitation suggested by Ochoa and Wistrich
include promoting the cultural value of diligence, encouraging prompt enforcement of
substantive law, avoiding retrospective application of contemporary standards, and
reducing the volume of litigation.93 Richardson discussed the need for a statute of
limitations in terms of balancing interests stating:
With time, a plaintiff’s interest in bringing a claim is less compelling, the
defendant’s opportunity to mount an effective defense tends to decrease,
and society’s courts are more likely to experience frustration in
adjudicating the claim.  That is why statutes of limitations are related to
time, not because there is anything per se wrong with a time lapse, but
                                                                                                                                                
90 Barrington v. A.H. Robins Co., 39 Cal.3d 146, 152, 702 P. 2d 563, 566 (1985).
91 Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478,487 (1980); See also, United States v. Kubrick 444 U.S.
111, 117 (1979) asserting that statutes of limitation “protect defendants and the courts from having to deal
with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by
death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise.”
92 Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 9, at 476.
93 Id. at 488-500.
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rather because a time lapse affects the balance of the relevant interests.
Statutes of limitations exist not because lapse of time is intrinsically
wrongful or undesirable in and of itself, but because a time lapse
effectively turns the balance of interests in favor of barring a claim.94
The Plaintiff’s Interest
Legislatures and Courts balance the interests of the Defendant in shortening the
lapse of time with a strong and often compelling public policy that strives to adjudicate
plaintiff’s claims on the merits rather than on procedural grounds.95 The very purpose of
our legal system is to resolve disputes on their merits.96  This concept is so entrenched in
our legal system that it prompted one commentator to offer:
No democratic political theory can ignore the sense of injustice that
smolders in the psyche of the victim of injustice. If democracy means
anything morally, it signifies that the lives of all citizens matter, and that
their sense of their rights must prevail. Everyone deserves a hearing at the
very least….97
In addition, plaintiffs have an interest in deterring future medical malpractice with
the threat of social or financial sanction. Besides compensating the injuries of plaintiffs,
tort law strives to deter unsafe behavior that may result in injury.98 Some commentator’s
however, have expressed a concern that the availability of medical malpractice insurance
to cover the economic consequences of medical negligence has resulted in a short-
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circuiting of the deterrence effect of medical negligence law.99 The concept that the
purchase of liability insurance undermines deterrence does not take into account the non-
economic consequences of medical malpractice.100 The medical community in general
strongly prohibits medical malpractice. As one scholar stated:
Many doctors believe that if a doctor ‘commits malpractice,’ as defined by
the medical community then the doctor is incompetent…The law-abiding
citizen obeys the law because he or she wants to do the right thing and
because he or she fears disapproval of his or her peer group if he or she
violates the law. Likewise, a doctor wants to do the right thing and fears
disapproval of other members of the medical community…The basis for
the prohibition in medicine means that current empirical efforts to evaluate
deterrence are misplaced. One should carefully consider medicine’s
autonomously created and administered laws when evaluating the medical
malpractice system’s ability to deter future injuries.101
Additionally, the argument that insurance undermines deterrence mistakenly assumes that
all health care providers are fully insured, that all claims are insurable, and that liability
premiums will not be adjusted upward in light of large or repeated claims.102
Legislatures and Courts also desire to do justice by providing redress for wrongs
suffered by plaintiffs at the hands of negligent defendants.103 Through vindication of
meritorious claims, plaintiffs not only receive monetary compensation for their injuries,
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but the satisfaction of vengeance against those who have wronged them.104 Courts are
faced with the difficult and non-theoretical task, for example, of extinguishing the claim
of a woman whose breast cancer was negligently misdiagnosed and now faces death or
the claim of a young family with an infant who will be a life-long dependant due to
malpractice during its birth, because such claims were filed perhaps only a few, short
days after a procedural limitation. Such cases make difficult choices and to extinguish
them can offend our sense of justice. Yet, Courts are faced with interpreting statutes of
limitation in the context of balancing such interests. As the Supreme Court stated, “It
goes without saying that statutes of limitations often make it impossible to enforce what
were otherwise perfectly valid claims. But that is their very purpose, and they remain as
ubiquitous as the statutory rights or other rights to which they are attached or are
applicable.”105 The following chapter will discuss some of the specific ways courts and
legislatures have attempted to balance the competing interests of plaintiffs and
defendants.
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CHAPTER 4
ACCRUAL AND TOLLING
In an attempt to balance the interests of defendants and plaintiffs legislatures have
enacted exceptions that toll the statute of limitations and courts have interpreted the
accrual of such statutes to favor either plaintiffs or defendants.  Statutes of limitation and
repose impact existing claims depending upon when a statute accrues or begins to run,
and when a statute is tolled or is suspended. Although the time limitation dictated by a
statute of repose is fairly constant, the accrual of a statute of limitations is not always so
straightforward.
Accrual of Statutes of Limitation
The Georgia Supreme Court recognized four points in time when a cause of action
sounding in tort may accrue:
(I)When the defendant breaches his duty; (II) when the plaintiff is first
injured; (III) when the plaintiff becomes aware of his injury; or (IV) when
the plaintiff discovers the causal relationship between his injury and the
defendant’s breach of duty.106
As an example, suppose a young mother of two consults with her physician
regarding a lump in her breast. Her physician deciding that the lump is simply
fibrocystic disease neither refers her for a mammogram nor performs a biopsy.
The lump continues to increase in size, but the patient’s physician assures her that
it is benign. Five years from her initial visit to her physician she seeks a second
22
opinion because of unexplained weight loss and other sequelae. The second
physician diagnoses breast cancer originating from the sight of the initial lump
which has now spread to her sternum and throughout her lymph system.  The
second physician informs her that the first physician should have either referred
her for a mammogram or referred her for a biopsy.
In this hypothetical case, point I of accrual occurred when the plaintiff
first consulted her physician and he breached his duty to refer her for a
mammogram or biopsy. Point II of accrual occurred when the cancer metastasized
and spread through her body. Point III of accrual occurred when the plaintiff
knew or should have known she had breast cancer, more than likely upon a
definitive diagnosis from her second physician. Point IV of accrual occurred when
she discovered that her first physician should have sent her for further tests and
his failure resulted in the metastasis of her breast cancer. The final two points in
time are examples of when a cause of action may accrue in jurisdictions that
recognize a discovery rule.107
Many state’s statutes of limitation contain a “discovery rule” which sets
the point of accrual at the time the plaintiff knew or should have known, with the
exercise of reasonable care and diligence, that they were injured by a healthcare
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provider.108 The U.S. Supreme Court stated that there were two possible
approaches to the construction of the word “accrue” in a statute of limitations:
A claim might be deemed to ‘accrue’ at the moment of injury without
regard to the potentially harsh consequence of barring a meritorious
claim before the plaintiff has a reasonable chance to assert his legal
rights, or it might ‘accrue’ when a diligent plaintiff has knowledge of
facts sufficient to put him on notice of an invasion of his legal rights.109
The significance of the date of accrual cannot be overemphasized. 110 No matter
the length of the limitations period stated in the statute, the deadline for the statute of
limitations to begin to run can vary considerably based upon the time of accrual.111  As
one commentator stated, “The point is that a limitations period by itself sets no deadline
for bringing a claim; a deadline is set only by counting the limitations period off from the
date of accrual.”112 States diverge widely in their definition of when a claim accrues.113
Some state legislatures actually define when their statute “accrues”, but more often state
courts interpret the time of accrual.114 The current statute of limitations in the state of
Georgia does not contain a discovery rule, nor does is contain a definition of when the
statute accrues.115 Georgia’s statute of limitations has been held to run when the injury or
death resulting from a negligent act or omission occurs, rather than when the plaintiff
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discovers his injury or the negligence that resulted in his injury.116 While accrual
addresses the point at which a statute of limitations begins to run, there are various
exceptions to the statute of limitations, which suspend or toll their running.  Although
several exceptions to the statute of limitations exist in various states, this paper will
address four of the more common exceptions.
Tolling Statutes of Limitation: Minority
Most state’s statutes of limitation contain or are modified by a tolling exception
for minority.  This period of tolling varies from state to state. In California, for example,
actions for a minor must be commenced from the date of the alleged wrongful act just as
it is for adults, unless the child is less than six years old.117  If a child is less than six, a
claim must be filed within three years or prior to his eighth birthday whichever is a longer
period.118  In Texas, a provision tolling the statute of limitations for minors under the age
of twelve years and giving them until their fourteenth birthday to file suit, was held
unconstitutional under the open courts provision of the Texas constitution.119 Under the
Texas Court’s ruling, a minor now has until two years after his eighteenth birthday in
which to file suit, plus an additional seventy-five days if a proper notice letter is sent,
leaving a potential insurance tail of twenty years plus two and one half months for a birth
related injury.120
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 Missouri’s constitution like Texas contains a similar open courts provision.121
Missouri’s statute of limitation contained a tolling provision for minors under the age of
ten, giving them until their twelfth birthday to file suit.122 The Missouri Supreme Court
declared its statute unconstitutional under the open courts provision ruling that a minor’s
cause of action is tolled until the minor reaches the age of majority and can bring an
action on her own behalf.123 South Carolina tolls its statute of limitations seven years for
minors, while Maryland generously tolls its statute of limitations until three years after a
minor turns eighteen.124
 Some courts view minority as a form of temporary disability which is removed
once a minor reaches majority.125 Courts weigh the need to decrease the long tail of
liability with a longstanding public policy protecting minors. In a Utah case the Supreme
Court suggested two reasons why minors should be granted special treatment.126  The
Court first suggested that minors lack the capacity to sue stating, “Because of their lack
of experience, judgment, knowledge, resources, and awareness, minors cannot effectively
assert and protect their legal rights.”127 The Court then suggested that minors should be
granted special treatment because their parents or legal guardians are under no legal
obligation to sue on their behalf.128 The Court stated, “Although lawsuits asserting a
violation of a minor’s rights may be brought by parents, general guardians, or next
friends as guardians ad litem, such persons have no legal duty to assert or otherwise
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protect a minor’s legal claims.”129 As the California Supreme Court suggested, “Our
courts have repeatedly recognized the strong public policy protecting minors against the
loss of their rights due to the operation of statutes of limitations.”130
The Foreign Object Exception
 A second frequently seen tolling provision is for foreign objects left or placed in
the body. Tolling provisions for foreign objects usually contain some form of discovery
rule.131 At least twenty-two states have adopted discovery rules in foreign object cases.132
The Texas Supreme Court stated, “The discovery rule referred to may be stated as the
legal principle that a statute of limitations barring prosecution of an action for medical
malpractice runs, not from the date of the practitioner’s wrongful act or omission, but
from the date the nature of the injury was or should have been discovered by the
plaintiff.”133
In a classic foreign object case, a Pennsylvania man underwent surgery for an
ulcer.134 He continued to experience pain and finally, after a series of tests and
approximately nine years after his surgery, he discovered that the surgeon had left a
surgical sponge in his abdomen.135 The defendant surgeon asserted that the plaintiff’s
claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations.136 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court holding for the plaintiff stated, “The man who buries a time bomb would argue
futilely that he could not be held responsible for a resulting death because the explosion
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and death of his victim did not occur until more than a year after he had placed the
bomb.” Judge Musmanno, further addressing whether or not the plaintiff could have
discovered the cause of his discomfort by the exercise of reasonable care stated,
“Certainly he could not open his abdomen like a door and look in; certainly he would
need to have medical advice and counsel; certainly he would have to be dependent upon
those who with appropriate instruments and devices could pierce the wall of flesh which
hid from his own eyes the cause of his wretchedness.”137
In states that recognize the foreign object exception to the statute of limitations,
the two issues that most frequently arise are whether or not the plaintiff exercised
reasonable care in the discovery of the foreign object and whether or not the object is
“foreign.”  An Idaho woman brought an action against her gynecologist three years after
the insertion of an intrauterine device (I.U.D) for birth control purposes.138 The
gynecologist told the plaintiff he removed the device during a subsequent sterilization
procedure.139 She continued, however, to experience pain and chronic pelvic infections
until she sought a second opinion and discovered the I.U.D. had been left in her body.140
The issue before the court was whether the I.U.D. was a foreign object within the
meaning of the foreign object exception to the statute of limitations.141 The Court held
that when an I.U.D. is supposed to have been removed, it is no longer deliberately within
the body and is therefore properly defined as a foreign object.142
                                                                                                                                                
136Id. at 283-284.
137 Id. at 289.
138 Ogle v. DeSano, 107 Idaho 872, 693 P.2d 1074 (1984).
139 Ogle, 107 Idaho at 874.
140 Id.
141 107 Idaho at 1076.
142 107 Idaho at 1078.
28
In a New York case, however, the Court distinguished I.U.D. claims holding that
glass left in a plaintiff’s forearm did not constitute a foreign object although the
defendant doctor failed to remove all of it, because the doctor did not initially place the
glass in the plaintiff’s arm unlike doctors in I.U.D. cases.143 In another New York case, a
plastic stent (a round plastic tube) was placed in a plaintiff’s nose for post surgery healing
purposes.144 The stent, a temporary device was supposed to be removed with the packing
material ten days after surgery, but the doctor failed to remove it.145 For the following six
years the plaintiff suffered from chronic nasal and respiratory problems.146 Finally, a new
doctor performed endoscopic rhinoscopy, discovered the stent and removed it.147 The
plaintiff argued that his claim fell within the foreign object exception to the statute of
limitations, but the New York Court held that the stent was not a foreign object.148
The Fraud Exception
Fraud also tolls the statue of limitations in many states. Fraud can be a knowing
concealment or it can be an affirmative action to mislead by the health care provider.149
In either case fraud, like the foreign object exception, tolls the statute of limitations until
the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the defendant’s fraud.150 The Supreme
Court of Colorado held that the fraud exception “…does not toll the statute of limitations
perpetually, rather it extends the statute of limitations until two years after the person
bringing the action discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence and concern
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should have discovered the act or omission.”151 Some state’s legislatures and courts refer
to their fraud exception as a knowing concealment exception or fraudulent concealment
exception152 In Missouri, the plaintiff that wishes to invoke the fraudulent concealment
exception has the burden of proving six elements:
(1) In treating the plaintiff, the [doctor] did or failed to do something that
caused the injury; 2) The [doctor’s] conduct failed to meet the required
standards of professional competence and was therefore negligent; 3) The
[doctor] had actual knowledge that he or she caused the injury; 4) With
that knowledge, the [doctor] intended by post-injury conduct and
statements to conceal from the patient the existence of a claim for
malpractice; 5) The [doctor’s] acts were fraudulent; and 6) The patient
was not guilty of a lack of diligence in sooner ascertaining the truth.153
In a Colorado case, a patient had surgery for gall bladder removal.154 When the
physician probed the common duct of the gall bladder, he perforated it causing bile to
leak into the patient’s abdomen.155 Although two cholangiograms taken before the
physician probed the duct showed no leak and two cholangiograms taken after the
physician probed the duct indicated a leak, the physician nonetheless discharged the
patient to her home where her condition predictably worsened.156 When the patient
confronted her physician he told her that a gallstone caused the hole in her bile duct.157
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The patient was readmitted to the hospital requiring a second surgery to repair the duct.158
She did not find out that the hole in her bile duct was caused by a puncture during surgery
until 5 years after the event and two years beyond the statute of limitations.159
The Colorado Supreme Court holding for the plaintiff stated, “The knowing
concealment exception to [the statute of limitations] embodies the common law concept
that a wrongdoer should not be able to take advantage of his own wrong…It prevents a
doctor from benefiting from his or her own efforts to hinder the claimant’s discovery of
the cause of action against the doctor.”160 The policy behind the fraud exception to the
statute of limitations lies in the equitable concept of estoppel.  As the superior court of
Pennsylvania stated, “Where through fraud or concealment, the defendant causes the
plaintiff to relax his vigilance or deviate from his right of inquiry, the defendant is
estopped from invoking the bar of the statute of limitations.”161
The Continuous Treatment Exception
The continuous treatment exception is another common exception to the statute of
limitations. The exception, which was first addressed by the Ohio Supreme Court in
1902, has been adopted both judicially and by statute.162  The North Carolina Court of
Appeals discussed what a plaintiff must prove to take advantage of the exception:
The plaintiff must show the existence of a continuing relationship with his
physician…Mere continuity of the general physician-patient relationship
is insufficient to permit one to take advantage of the continuing course of
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treatment doctrine…Subsequent treatment must consist of either an
affirmative act or an omission which must be related to the original
act…Plaintiff is not entitled to the benefits of the continuing course of
treatment doctrine if during the course of the treatment plaintiff knew or
should have known of his or her injuries.163
North Carolina’s continuous treatment exception is judicially recognized while New
York has codified its continuous treatment exception. New York’s statute of limitations
provides:
An action for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice must be commenced
within two years and six months of the act, omission or failure complained
of or last treatment where there is continuous treatment for the same
illness, injury or condition which gave rise to the said act, omission or
failure…For the purpose of this section the term ‘continuous treatment’
shall not include examinations undertaken at the request of the patient for
the sole purpose of ascertaining the state of the patient’s condition.164
The New York Court of Appeals discussed the purpose behind the continuing treatment
exception stating, “The doctrine rests on the premise that the trust and confidence that
marks such relationships puts the patient at a disadvantage in questioning the doctors skill
because to sue while undergoing treatment necessarily interrupts the course of
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treatment.”165 The Court stated that it would be “absurd” to expect a wronged patient to
interrupt possible corrective treatment to serve a summons on their physician.166  The
New York courts do not seem to require a patient’s ignorance of the defendant’s
negligence as the North Carolina courts do, but they have emphasized that a patient must
be under continuous treatment for the same or related illness or injury.167 The New courts
have stated that plaintiffs should not have to interrupt ongoing treatment because the
“doctor not only is in a position to identify and correct malpractice, but also is best placed
to do so.”168
In an early case examining the continuous treatment exception, the Kansas
Supreme Court held emphatically that “limitations are created by statute and are
legislative, not judicial acts.”169 Kansas has expressly rejected the judicially created
doctrine of continuous treatment as has several other states.170  As one commentator
suggested:
The states which have allowed the use of the continuous treatment rule or
a de facto version of the rule have often done so based on notions of
fairness or “corrective justice.” Those jurisdictions where the doctrine has
been rejected have based their decisions on legislative intent and the
protective purpose of the statute of limitations.171
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Even if various exceptions toll the statute of limitations in the interest of plaintiffs, what
about the outer limits of time dictated by the statute of repose? Next, this paper will
address issues of accrual and tolling with regard to statutes of repose.
Statutes of Repose: Accrual vs. Abolition
As previously suggested Statutes of Repose substantively differ from statutes of
limitation. Georgia’s Supreme Court, discussing statutes of repose, has stated:
…[T]he legislature may conclude that the time may arrive when past
transgressions are no longer actionable.  The long history of such
conclusions emphasizes their rationality.  From the biblical time of the
year of Jubilee to the present day, policymakers have exercised the right to
‘wipe the slate clean’ after a fixed period of time. In doing this, there is the
clear distinction between a statute of limitation ‘barring’ an action, and a
statute of repose providing for the abolition of a cause of action after the
passage of the time provided.172
As the Kansas Supreme Court stated, statutes of repose “serve to limit the time within
which an action may be commenced after the cause of action has accrued.”173 Statues of
limitation are considered a procedural limitation on a remedy while statutes of repose are
considered a substantive definition of rights.174
Although there are exceptions, a statute of repose generally disregards the date of
discovery of the injury, or if injury occurs at a subsequent date, and generally does not
have tolling provisions.175 As Price advised, “It is impossible to toll or delay a right that
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no longer exists.”176 She also suggested, “A repose statute generally supplements or
overrides the discovery rule…It is a time limitation that ‘acts as a condition precedent to
the action itself’, whereas an ordinary statute of limitations is ‘clearly procedural,’
affecting only the remedy directly and not the right to recover.”177 Some have proposed
that a statute of repose starts to run from the date of the wrongful act or omission
“whether or not the act produces a contemporaneous injury,” in contrast to a statute of
limitations which does not begin to run until a cause of action evidenced by injury or
damage is present.178
It is possible for a plaintiff to be within the statute of limitations and yet, run afoul
of the statute of repose. A common scenario in the state of Georgia is that a plaintiff files
suit for malpractice and then some years later, for tactical or other reasons, dismisses and
refiles within six months under Georgia’s renewal statute.179  The Georgia renewal statute
allows a plaintiff to dismiss a case voluntarily and refile within six months and for statute
of limitations purposes it would be as if plaintiff filed on the original date.180 However, if
a plaintiff refiles more than five years from the date that the statute began to run,
regardless of the renewal statute, the statute of repose extinguishes the plaintiff’s cause of
action.181 The Georgia Supreme Court stated, “Both logic and the plain language of the
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statutes lead us to conclude that the legislature never intended for the dismissal and
renewal statutes to overcome the statute of repose.”182
Another common scenario where a plaintiff’s claim can be extinguished by the
statute of repose and yet be within the statute of limitations is in delayed injury cases. For
example, if a pathologist misdiagnoses a malignant melanoma and the plaintiff is not
injured until the melanoma metastasizes, the injury may occur beyond the five-year
period specified by the statute of repose, yet still be within the two-year statute
limitations.183 Although many statutes of repose do not contain tolling provisions, some
courts have begun to carve out exceptions which toll the statute of repose as well as the
statute of limitations.
Statutes of Repose: Tolling Provisions
Some scholars posit that a substantive right, such as that provided by a statute of
repose, cannot be tolled.184 Yet, some courts when faced with extinguishing plaintiffs’
rights have recognized the tolling of statutes of repose and legislatures have written
exceptions into the statutes themselves.185 In a 1993 Utah case, an infant in his first year
began to experience disturbing tremors.186 The concerned mother brought her infant to
the defendant neurologist who diagnosed encephalomyelitis.187 Not until approximately
nine months later, was the child diagnosed with hydrocephalus by a subsequent doctor.188
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By that time, the child suffered from mental retardation due to the pressure exerted on the
brain by the hydrocephalus.189
The child’s mother did not file a complaint until more than four years from the
defendant doctor’s misdiagnosis and two years from the subsequent doctor’s diagnosis of
hydrocephalus.190 In the mother’s complaint she asserted that the child’s hydrocephalus
was treatable and had her son been diagnosed earlier, he would not be mentally retarded
and permanently handicapped.191 The Utah Supreme Court, confronted with a statute of
repose that specifically excluded minors from any tolling provision, struck down the
statute as unconstitutional holding that minors and adults were not similarly situated
under the law and were entitled to “special rules” necessary to protect their rights.192
In 1953, the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized a foreign object exception to the
two-year statute of repose then in effect. 193 When the Arkansas Legislature revised its
statute of repose for medical malpractice in 1979, it included a foreign object exception
which tolls the statute of repose until one year after the foreign object is discovered.194
Colorado’s statute of repose also specifically includes an exception for foreign objects
providing, “Except as otherwise provided in this section … in no event shall an action be
brought more than three years after the act or omission which gave rise to the action…
[unless such] act or omission consisted of leaving an unauthorized foreign object in the
body of the patient….”195
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Some courts recognize an exception that tolls the statute of repose based on fraud
or fraudulent concealment and some do not.  In 1988 a Tennessee man injured his back at
work.196 He consulted an orthopedic surgeon who performed back surgery on him using
pedicle screws as a fixation device.197 The defendant surgeon did not inform the plaintiff
that such screws would be used during surgery, neither did the defendant inform the
plaintiff that the screws were considered experimental and had not been approved by the
Food and Drug Administration.198 The plaintiff experienced persistent, acute pain after
surgery and eventually discovered that one of the screws had broken necessitating
surgical removal.199 Approximately four years and nine months after the pedicle screws
were implanted, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against his orthopedic surgeon.200 The
Tennessee Supreme Court recognized that the three-year statute of repose could be tolled
where there was fraudulent concealment on the part of the defendant and held that the
plaintiff’s case should survive a motion for summary judgment.201 The Court stated:
Fiduciary relationship, confidential relationship, constructive fraud and
fraudulent concealment are all parts of the same concept. The nature of the
relationship which creates a duty to disclose and a breach of that duty
constitutes constructive fraud or fraudulent concealment, springs from the
confidence and trust reposed by one in another, who by reason of a
specific skill, knowledge, training or expertise, is in a superior position to
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advise or act on behalf of the party bestowing trust or confidence in
him.202
In contrast, the Kansas Supreme Court held in a 1996 case that although it appeared that
the defendant doctor had fulfilled the elements of “fraud by silence” when he failed to
inform the plaintiff of her treatable, congenital back condition, her claim was nonetheless
extinguished by the statute of repose. 203
Some courts when confronted with difficult cases have recognized an exception to
the statute of repose based on the continuing treatment doctrine.  In a recent case, the
Connecticut Supreme Court acknowledged that a continuing course of conduct tolls the
statute of repose.204 A married father of one was sent for a surgical consultation when his
family physician found an enlarged lymph node in his neck.  The surgeon removed the
node and sent it to a pathologist who determined that the node was benign.205 Relying on
the pathologist’s determination, the plaintiff did not pursue further treatment until he
discovered he was suffering from non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma some eleven years later.206
A reexamination of the slide revealed a comment by the pathologist at the bottom of the
report made to the surgeon.207 The pathologist’s note read, “I’d be interested in a follow
up on this patient!! I think at the time we were concerned that [the plaintiff] might be
evolving a small lymphocytic lymphoma.”208
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant pathologist’s failure to disclose his
ongoing concern about the possibility of cancer was tantamount to a duty that triggered
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the course of conduct doctrine.209 The defendant pathologist asserted that the three-year
statute of repose began to run when he examined the specimen of the plaintiff’s lymph
node.210 The Court held that there was evidence of a continuing course of conduct and
that such conduct could toll the statute of repose.211 The Court stated, “A statute of
limitations or repose may be tolled under the continuing course of conduct doctrine,
thereby allowing a plaintiff to commence his or her lawsuit at a later date.”212
Price, a commentator addressing a similar case in North Carolina, indicated that
applying the continuing course of treatment doctrine to toll the statute of repose has the
potential for “untoward results.”213 She suggested that applying the continuous course of
treatment doctrine to toll the statute “would extend indefinitely the period of time in
which patients with latent injuries could file suit.”214 Such a result, she asserted, frustrates
the purpose behind the statute of repose enacted by the legislature “as a means of
decreasing exorbitant malpractice insurance rates.”215  She stated:
The application of the ‘continued course of treatment’ doctrine to
determine the date of accrual in an action involving nonapparent injuries
has the effect of rendering the statute of repose useless…The result is
contrary to the reasoning underlying the enactment of a statute of repose:
to extinguish the right of action after a fixed number of years, regardless
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of whether a patient has discovered his or her injury or terminated
treatment.216
The Illinois Supreme Court declined to toll the statute of repose based on the continuous
course of treatment doctrine holding that:
The legislature has clearly stated that no cause of action be brought more
than four years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or
occurrence alleged in such action to have been the cause of such
injury…We find it significant that the General Assembly has amended
section 13-212 numerous times but has never expressly provided for any
exception to the statute of repose except for cases of fraudulent
concealment.217
Other states Supreme Courts, as previously shown, have disagreed with the Illinois
Supreme Court, however. As one commentator remarked, “The justifications for adopting
a rule that would allow the victims of lengthy medical negligence to seek a remedy
exceed the justifications for strict adherence to [time limitations].”218
Statutes of limitation and repose strongly affect plaintiffs, defendants, and
defendant’s insurers.  Each state enacted its own statute of limitations and repose in an
attempt to balance these various interests. This paper will explore some of the time
limitation strategies employed by different states in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
TIME LIMITATIONS STRATEGIES
Many states faced with the same need for tort reform, responded with a
multiplicity of strategies including a variety of statutes of limitation and repose, some
favoring plaintiff’s interests and some favoring defendant’s. Despite the insurance crises
of the 1970s and 1980s, some states continued to embrace a discovery rule and an
extended period of accrual.
Plaintiff Favored Accrual
California enacted the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act “as a response to a
perceived major health care crisis in the State of California attributable to skyrocketing
malpractice premium costs and resulting in a potential breakdown of the health delivery
system.”219 Prior to 1975, the statute of limitations was four years after the date of injury
or one year after the plaintiff discovered or through reasonable diligence should have
discovered the injury, whichever occurred first.220 After 1975, the legislature reduced the
statute of limitations to 3 years and retained the one-year discovery rule.221 It, however,
added a statute of repose providing that in no event should the time of commencement of
legal action exceed three years unless tolled by certain enumerated exceptions.222 The
three-year statute of repose does not commence to run until the plaintiff is “aware of the
physical manifestation of the injury without regard to awareness of the negligent
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cause.”223 According to the California Supreme Court, the statute was enacted, “not to
reduce the potential malpractice liability of doctors,” but to construct a compromise
between “a concern over the extended exposure of medical practitioners to malpractice
liability and a desire not to bar potentially worthy plaintiffs from court before they have a
fair chance to bring suit.”224
The Ohio Supreme Court also evinced concern over barring plaintiff’s potential
claims. In response to the medical malpractice insurance crisis, the Ohio legislature
enacted a statute of limitations that “commenced within one year after the cause of action
accrued.”225 Although the term “accrued” was open to judicial interpretation, Ohio
enacted a firm four-year statute of repose providing, “In no event shall any action upon a
medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic claim be commenced more than four years
after the occurrence of the act or omission constituting the alleged basis of the medical,
dental, optometric, or chiropractic claim.”226 Prior to 1975, Ohio’s statute for medical
malpractice had no statute of repose.227 Over time Ohio’s courts interpreted the point of
accrual to encompass a discovery rule so that “the statute of limitations was tolled until
the patient discovered or should have discovered the negligence with reasonable
diligence.”228 After the medical malpractice crisis reached “alarming proportions”,
Ohio’s legislature enacted the four-year statute of repose.229
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Ohio’s statute of repose received a constitutional challenge in 1987.230 The Ohio
Supreme Court stated that the four-year statute of repose accomplished “one purpose - to
deny a remedy for the wrong.”231 It also ruled that the statute of repose violated Section
16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution which provides, “All courts shall be open, and
every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or
delay.”232 It finally held that the statute of repose was unconstitutional “as applied to bar
the claims of medical malpractice plaintiffs who did not know or could not reasonably
have known of their injuries.”233 Thus, the Court when faced with conflicting interests
tipped its scales in favor of plaintiffs and delivered a “devastating blow” to Ohio’s statute
of repose.234
South Carolina’s statute of limitations provides that an action for medical
malpractice “must be commenced within three years from the date of the treatment,
omission, or operation giving rise to the cause of action or three years from the date of
discovery or when it reasonably ought to have been discovered.”235 South Carolina has a
six-year statute of repose.236 Despite South Carolina’s more liberal statute of limitations
and repose, the South Carolina Court of Appeals is leaning toward the adoption of a
continuous treatment rule.237 As one commentator stated:
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The justifications for adopting a rule that would allow the victims of
lengthy medical negligence the opportunity to seek a remedy exceed the
justifications for strict adherence to prior interpretations of the statute of
limitations, such as the need to protect the medical profession from an
insurance crisis.238
Defendant Favored Accrual
New York enacted a more stringent defendant favored statute of limitations. New
York’s statute of limitations for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice provides that an
action “must be commenced within two years and six months of the act, omission or
failure.”239 It does not recognize a discovery rule.240 When faced with a due process
challenge to the statute of limitations, the New York Supreme Court stated:
The medical malpractice Statute of Limitations was shortened from three
years to two years and six months by the 1975 enactment of CPLR 214-a
in response to the ‘critical threat to the health and welfare of the State by
way of diminished delivery of health care services as a result of the lack of
adequate medical malpractice insurance coverage at reasonable rates.’(see,
Governor’s Mem, L 1975, ch 109, 1975 NY Legis Ann, at 1739-1740).
Clearly, the objective of preserving the quality of health care services for
residents of the State is a legitimate governmental objective.  Furthermore,
the Legislature’s decision to shorten the period of limitation and to
continue to measure accrual of a cause of action for medical malpractice
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from the date of occurrence as opposed to the date of discovery of the
injury, was rationally related to the accomplishment of that objective.241
Although the Court recognized that the statute would leave some plaintiff’s without a
remedy through no fault of their own, it deemed that the harsh results were neither
unreasonable, nor arbitrary given the State’s objective.242
Illinois’ medical malpractice statute of limitations provides that an action must be
brought “two years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of the existence of
the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action, whichever of such date
occurs first.”243 It also provides for a four-year statute of repose “after the date on which
occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged in such action to have been the cause
of such injury or death.”244 Prior to 1965, the general provisions of the Limitations Act
governed medical malpractice actions.245 Over time Illinois case law developed to
encompass a discovery rule in certain proscribed circumstances.246
The early 1970s brought the medical malpractice insurance crisis.247 “By October
1975, 39 States had commissioned studies of the medical malpractice problem and 22
States had revised civil practice laws and rules in an attempt to remedy the problem.”248
Illinois enacted “An Act to revise the law in relation to medical malpractice” which
changed the existing statute of limitations to eliminate the discovery rule.249 In 1979, the
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Illinois Supreme Court received several constitutional challenges involving the validity of
its new statute.250 Responding to these challenges, the Court stated:
The discovery rule was thought to have played a significant role in the
medical malpractice crisis. Because it created what came to be called the
“long tail” of liability, the discovery rule reduced an insurance company’s
ability to predict future liabilities…Responding to these problems, various
State and national commissions recommended placing an outside limit on
the discovery rule in medical malpractice cases…Although such a result --
a cause of action barred before its discovery -- seems harsh and unfair, the
reasonableness of the statute must be judged in light of the circumstances
confronting the legislature and the end which it sought to accomplish.251
The Court upheld the constitutionality of its new statute of limitations and repose finding
no due process or equal protection violations.252
The North Carolina General Assembly responded to rising medical liability
premiums in the mid-1970s by enacting a limitations statute less favorable to plaintiffs, as
well.253 In 1976, the legislature eliminated the existing discovery rule by changing the
accrual point for the statute of limitations for medical malpractice to “the time of the
occurrence of the last act of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action.”254  It then
reduced the statute of repose from ten years to four years.255
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Missouri’s statute of limitations also favors defendants. According to one
commentator, “The deference given to members of the health care profession in the form
of a shortened window of potential liability is a product of Missouri’s longstanding
public policy.”256 Missouri’s General Assembly enacted its statute of limitations and
repose in 1976.257 The single sentence, rambling statute contains 187 words and provides
that an action for medical malpractice “shall be brought within two years from the date
occurrence of the act of neglect complained of.”258 It additionally, however, provides for
a generous ten-year statute of repose.259 Some have demanded a shortening of the ten-
year statute of repose calling on the General Assembly to “revisit the medical negligence
statute to ensure that the statute’s historical protections remain available to Missouri’s
health care providers.”260
Seeking Middle Ground
Delaware in an attempt to balance both the interests of plaintiffs and defendants
developed a sort of hybrid statue of limitations. Before 1976, Delaware’s general
personal injury statute of limitations covered medical malpractice actions.261 By 1968,
Delaware’s Supreme Court expanded the two-year statute of limitations to include a
discovery rule.262 The Court held where injuries are “inherently unknowable” and the
plaintiff is “blamelessly ignorant,” the statute did not begin to run until the injuries
manifested themselves.263 In 1976, the Delaware legislature enacted a new medical
malpractice statute of limitations which was promulgated to close the potentially open-
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ended period of limitations established by the Supreme Court.264 The Delaware Supreme
Court refers to the new statute as a “hybrid” statute of limitations.265
The statute provides that no action for medical malpractice “shall be brought after
the expiration of two years from the date upon which such injury occurred.”266 But, the
statute additionally provides that if the injury “was unknown to and could not in the
exercise of reasonable diligence have been discovered by the injured person, such action
may be brought prior to the expiration of 3 years from the date upon which such injury
occurred.”267 Thus, the statute affords the extension of one year for cases where the injury
with due diligence could not have been discovered, a breed of limited discovery rule.268
Delaware’s new “hybrid” statute of limitations is designed to appease both parties and
has shaped subsequent substantive law in that state.269 Although, states have answered the
competing interests of plaintiffs and defendants by enacting a variety of time limitations,
many states faced constitutional challenges to their new statutes of limitation and repose.
The following chapter will review the basis for some of these challenges and the resulting
outcomes.
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CHAPTER 6
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Prior to the insurance crisis of the 1970s most states general limitations for tort
actions applied to claims for medical malpractice.270 Ultimately, however, every state
adopted new statutes of limitation that often substituted the previous discovery-based
general limitations for more restrictive limitations aimed solely at medical malpractice
plaintiffs.271 Professor Zablotsky describes four types of statutes that resulted from the
tort reform of the 1970s.272 According to Zablotsky:
The first group of statutes is occurrence based with no discovery
exceptions whatever…The second group is occurrence based with limited
discovery exceptions for malpractice actions involving either minors,
fraudulent concealment, continuous treatment, or foreign objects. The
discovery period for these exceptions, however, is capped at a stated
number of years…The third group of statutes is also occurrence based
with discovery exceptions…but, the period applicable to the exceptions is
not capped…The fourth group of statutes is discovery based for all
medical malpractice causes of action, but the discovery period is
capped.273
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After the perceived crisis of the 1970s not one state adopted a pure discovery based
statute of limitations for medical malpractice.274 Considering the consequences of such
statutes and the relative political powerlessness and vulnerability of medical malpractice
victims, it is no surprise that plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the statutes
shortly after enactment.275 Although most plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of
their state’s statute of limitations or repose on multiple fronts, for the purposes of analysis
this paper will address each category of challenge separately.
Equal Protection Challenges
One of the early equal protection challenges to a medical malpractice statute of
limitations occurred in New Hampshire. Prior to Carson v. Maurer, state courts were
divided regarding constitutional challenges to their newly reformed time limitations.276
In Carson, the New Hampshire Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of the New
Hampshire medical malpractice statute of limitations as it applied to latent injuries.277
The New Hampshire statute did not recognize a discovery rule except as to individuals
who were entitled the foreign object exception.278 The Court applied an equal protection
analysis under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.279 Generally,
the equal protection guarantee means that a state legislature may not create a
classification in the law that deprives a class of citizens rights enjoyed by those not so
classified.280 The New Hampshire Supreme Court held:
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[The statute of limitations] is invalid insofar as it makes the discovery rule
unavailable to all medical malpractice plaintiffs except those whose
actions are based upon the discovery of a foreign object in the injured
person’s body…The legislature may not abolish the discovery rule with
respect to any one class of medical malpractice cases in which the cause of
action is not discovered and could not reasonably be discovered during the
applicable limitation period, that period will not begin to run until the
plaintiff discovers both his injury and its cause.281
Standard of Review
When examining the Constitutionality of a statute whether under the Federal or
State Constitutions, courts apply one of three separate standards of review: strict scrutiny
for fundamental rights or suspect classifications, an intermediate standard for important
substantive rights, and a rational basis review for all other rights.282 Most states have
examined constitutional challenges to their statutes of limitation and repose under the
rational basis standard of review focusing on the absence of traditional suspect classes or
the violation of fundamental rights.283 The Carson court, however, employed
intermediate scrutiny stating:
Although the right to recover for personal injuries is not a ‘fundamental
right’ it is nevertheless an important substantive right…We now conclude,
however, that the substantive rights involved herein are sufficiently
important to require that the restrictions imposed on those rights be
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subjected to a more rigorous judicial scrutiny than allowed under the
rational basis test.284
Lerner has suggested that victims of medical malpractice should be considered a
suspect or semi-suspect class and thus, entitled to increased scrutiny.285 He proposes that
the political powerlessness of medical malpractice victims as compared to the powerful
medical professional and insurance industry lobbies, is functionally equivalent to other
suspect and semi-suspect classes.286 He also suggests that victims of medical malpractice
have a “quasi-fundamental right to bodily freedom from uncompensated private
assault.”287 “Surely,” he states, “no personal liberty can be more fundamental to the
individual than freedom from unconsented assaults.”288 Standards of review are critical to
the outcome of any constitutional challenge.289 Although statutes of limitation and repose
have been struck down under the rational basis standard of review, they are more likely to
withstand constitutional challenges under this lowest level of scrutiny.290 One
commentator suggested that courts have accepted, on occasion, “any conceivable
explanation to sustain the rationality of economic and social legislation” under the
rational basis test.291
The Colorado Supreme Court, however, in Austin v. Litvak  applied low level
scrutiny and yet struck down Colorado’s statute of repose.292 Austin was admitted to the
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hospital for kidney stones where through a series of tests his physician incorrectly
diagnosed a brain tumor resulting in an invasive exploratory surgery involving the
removal of part of the plaintiff’s skull and the placement of a permanent screen in his
head.293 The plaintiff’s physician informed him that his tumor was inoperable. 294Sixteen
years after the negligent misdiagnosis, Austin discovered that he never had a brain
tumor.295 In response to the plaintiff’s equal protection challenge, the Colorado Supreme
Court stated:
We are persuaded that the statutory classification prescribed by section 13-
80-105 fails to meet the [rational basis test]. The statutory exceptions
which permit ‘foreign object’ and ‘knowing concealment’ claimants but
not ‘negligently misdiagnosed’ plaintiffs to avoid the three-year statute of
repose and to invoke the discovery rule are without a rational basis in fact,
thereby creating an arbitrary classification.296
In contrast, the Illinois Supreme Court, applying a rational basis test, upheld Illinois’
statute of limitations against an equal protection challenge.297 After surveying the various
states which have upheld their statutes of limitation against such challenges, the Court
held:
The equal protection clause does not prevent a State from adjusting its
legislation to differences in situation. A statute effecting the classifications
of persons or objects is not unconstitutional merely because it affects one
class and not another, provided that it affects all members of the same
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class alike; so long as the classification is not arbitrary and is founded
upon some substantial difference in circumstances or conditions properly
related to the classification.298
Plaintiff’s bring constitutional challenges on multiple fronts usually adding due process
challenges to those of equal protection.
Due Process Challenges
The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution both prohibit
deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law.299 The fourteenth
amendment extends such prohibition to the states.300 Courts recognize two types of due
process, procedural and substantive.301 Procedural due process requires that a plaintiff
will be heard at a reasonable time with notice and in a meaningful manner.302 Substantive
due process requires that a statute bear a rational relationship to the underlying legislative
purpose.303 In practice the two types of due process, procedural and substantive, often
become blurred falling under the single aegis of a “due process analysis.”304
In Helgans v. Plurad, the New York Supreme Court upheld New York’s statute of
limitations against the plaintiff’s due process challenge.305 The decedent’s physician
excised a suspicious mole from her calf and sent it to the defendant pathologist who
stated it was benign.306 Eight years later the decedent discovered she had malignant
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melanoma originating from the site of the excised mole.307 Reexamination of the original
sample confirmed that the mole was malignant.308 The decedent’s husband asserted that
the statute of limitations violated his right to due process.309 The Court held:
The medical malpractice statute of limitations was shortened from three
years to two years and six months…in response to the ‘critical threat to the
health and welfare of the State by way of diminished delivery of health
care services as a result of the lack of adequate medical malpractice
insurance coverage at reasonable rates.’ Clearly, the objective of
preserving the quality of health care services of residents of the State is a
legitimate governmental objective. Furthermore, the Legislature’s decision
to shorten the period of limitation and to continue to measure accrual of a
cause of action for medical malpractice from the date of the occurrence, as
opposed to the date of discovery of the injury, was rationally related to the
accomplishment of that objective. Thus, [the statute] does not violate due
process.310
In 1997, in a similar case the Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down Wisconsin’s
statute of repose in Makos v. Wisconsin Masons Health Care Fund.311 In Makos the
decedent had a growth on her left leg biopsied and the defendant pathologist diagnosed it
as benign.312 Some nine years later the decedent was diagnosed with malignant
melanoma.313 The biopsy was reexamined and was found to be malignant.314  The
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plaintiff asserted that Wisconsin’s five-year statute of repose violated her procedural due
process rights.315 The Court stated that the opportunity to be heard was essential to “the
principles of fundamental fairness that are behind the Due Process Clause.”316 The Court
then held:
We find that to preclude this action was in violation of Cheryl Makos’
procedural due process rights.  There is no basic fairness to eliminate her
claim for injury before she knew or could have known that she was
injured.  The operation of the statute of repose effectively denied Cheryl
Makos her opportunity to be heard because the doors of the courtroom
were closed before she was even injured. Because her procedural due
process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment were violated,
we find [the statute of repose] to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt as applied in this case.317
However, just three short years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressly overruled
its decision in Makos holding that the Wisconsin statute of limitations and repose were
constitutional and did not violate procedural due process rights because “an unaccrued
cause of action is not a property interest.”318 Often, along with Equal Protection and Due
Process challenges, plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of a statute under state
constitutional provisions.
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State Constitutional Challenges
State constitutional provisions frequently contain broader protections under equal
protection, open court, and right to remedy provisions.319 Open court provisions are
generally adopted to ensure that justice will be available to every citizen of the state for
redress of wrongs without denial or delay.320 The majority of state courts have held that
their statutes of limitation and repose do not run afoul of the open court provisions of
their constitutions.321 Courts seem to rely on three main arguments when upholding their
statutes.322 One argument is that a legislature can abolish the right to bring a cause of
action because it is not a vested right.323 A second argument is that if plaintiffs are injured
after the expiration of the statute of repose they do not have a legally recognized injury
and therefore, the open courts provision does not apply.324 A third argument is that the
open courts provision applies only to actions by the judiciary, not by the legislature and
thus, statutes of repose do not fall under the open courts provision.325 Both open courts
and right to remedy provisions of state constitutions are generally analyzed under a
procedural due process test.326
Although the majority of state courts have upheld their time limitations statutes
under state constitutional provisions, the Ohio Supreme Court struck down its state’s
statute of repose under the Ohio Constitution’s “right to remedy” provision.327 The
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plaintiff’s claim under Ohio’s statute of repose would be extinguished before he knew of
the injury or could have reasonably discovered it.328 The Court held:
…A statute such as [Ohio’s statute of repose] unconstitutionally locks the
courtroom door before the injured party has had an opportunity to open it.
When the Constitution speaks of remedy and injury to person, property or
reputation, it requires an opportunity granted at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner. Accordingly we hold that [Ohio’s statute of repose],
as applied to bar the claims of medical malpractice plaintiffs who did not
know or could not reasonably have known of their injuries, violates the
right-to-a-remedy provision of Section 16, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution.329
In an Indiana case, the Appellate Court held that the statute of limitations violated
the open courts provision of the Indiana Constitution.330 The Court stated that the statute
as written “would require the plaintiffs to do the impossible - to sue before they had any
reason to know they should sue.”331 “Such a result,” stated the Court, “is rightly
described as ‘shocking’ and is so absurd and so unjust that it ought not be possible.”332
The Indiana Supreme Court did not, however, share the Appellate Court’s conviction.333
It held that the statute was facially constitutional and was to be upheld, but
unconstitutional under the open courts provision as applied to that particular plaintiff who
suffered from a latent injury.334 The Court stated:
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Although we agree with plaintiff and with the Court of Appeals that it was
error to grant summary judgment for the defendant, we need not strike
down the statute to reach this conclusion. Rather, giving due deference to
the function of the legislature and to its legislative enactment, we conclude
only that the statute of limitations is unconstitutional as applied to
plaintiff.335
Zablotsky submits that after Carson v. Maurer courts began to follow a pro-plaintiff
trend, striking down statutes of limitation under constitutional attack resulting in nearly
one third of states eviscerating their time limitations statutes for medical malpractice on
constitutional grounds.336 However, the majority of states have upheld their statutes
against constitutional attack and whether or not a pro-plaintiff pattern is emerging
remains to be seen.
Judicial Interpretation and Separation of Powers
Court’s decisions to uphold statutes against constitutional attack reflect trust by
the judiciary in the legislative process. If the court believes that the process of
representative democracy adequately weighs and properly resolves the competing
interests of health care providers, insurance companies and malpractice victims, it is less
likely to overturn statutes enacted by the legislature on constitutional grounds. This
unwillingness to overturn legislatively enacted law comports with democratic theory and
reflects a conservative view of the role of courts in disrupting the product of the
legislative process. One scholar stated, “Democratic theory suggests that elected
legislative bodies are generally best suited to make decisions requiring …a choice among
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values.”337 Conversely, a court’s willingness to overturn a statute on constitutional
grounds indicates mistrust that the legislative process adequately protects some
vulnerable group. Decisions that apply a heightened level of scrutiny give less deference
to the legislature raising fundamental questions about separation of powers and belief in
the democratic process.
Relatively recently, a theory of political science emerged which applies economic
principles to the political process known as “public choice theory.”338 Describing public
choice theory, Kahn stated:
In this view, representative democracy gives unwarranted weight to the
interests of small or discrete pressure groups, whose interests may be
directly opposed to the interests of the larger public. Advocates of this
view…have concluded that small groups of beneficiaries are more
effective in lobbying for special interest legislation than those larger
groups…As a result most regulation is viewed as merely special interest
legislation designed to serve some politically powerful group at the
expense of the public.339
Either openly or subliminally, some courts possess the same political cynicism as
public choice theorists.340 Courts are surely aware that the American Medical
Association, state medical associations, and economically powerful insurance lobbies
influence the legislature as evidenced by the mass tort reforms of the 1970s and 1980s.
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The judiciary may feel the need to protect malpractice victims from the harsh effects of
statutes enacted in response to these powerful lobbies and are thus, more willing to
overturn statutes when constitutionally challenged. Decisions that strike down tort reform
legislation reflect an activist role for the court as an appropriate organ of government to
protect underrepresented groups. However, the American Trial Lawyers Association and
some state trial lawyers associations provide an organized lobby on behalf of plaintiffs.
Although these lobbies may be powerful, the question remains whether they are powerful
enough to provide a meaningful counterbalance to the medical professional and insurance
lobbies. Given the draconian effects of many of the statutes of limitation and repose that
have been upheld in the face of constitutional challenges, the likelihood that trial lawyers
associations are providing an effective counterbalance seems remote. The next chapter
will narrow the focus to Georgia’s medical malpractice time limitations statutes and its
response to the divergent interests of plaintiffs and defendants.
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CHAPTER 7
THE LIMITATIONS OF MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS IN GEORGIA
The Georgia legislature and courts face the same dilemmas faced by other states
when enacting or interpreting time limitations. Since the legislature enacted a statute of
limitations and repose specifically for medical malpractice, Georgia courts have heard
repeated constitutional challenges to their validity under both the Federal Constitution
and Georgia’s State Constitution. This chapter will examine the development of
Georgia’s medical malpractice time limitations law and its evolving strategies for
balancing the conflicting interests of plaintiffs and defendants.
Accrual in Georgia
Prior to the insurance crisis of the 1970s, Georgia’s malpractice actions, like
many other states, were governed by the general tort statute of limitations, former Code
Ann. §3-1004.341 Under this general statute medical malpractice claims were to be
brought “within two years after the right of action accrued.” 342 The point when an action
“accrued” under the statute was left to judicial interpretation.343 Under Georgia’s case
law, a personal-injury claim accrued when an injury occasioned by the defendant’s
negligence occurred.344 In Everhart v. Rich’s, the Georgia Supreme Court held that, “On
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a tort claim for personal injury the statute of limitation generally begins to run at the time
damage caused by a tortuous act occurs, at which time the tort is complete.”345
In 1976, the Georgia General Assembly passed its first statute of limitations
directed solely at medical malpractice claims.346 Under the Act entitled, “Limitations of
Actions for Medical Malpractice” Code Ann. §3-1102, a plaintiff wishing to bring a
malpractice suit must file it “within two years after the date on which the negligent or
wrongful act or omission occurred.”347  The language of the new statute effectively
moved the point of accrual from the time of the plaintiff’s injury to the time of the
defendant’s negligent act. The statute had a draconian effect on plaintiffs with delayed or
latent injuries. As the Court stated in Allrid v. Emory University, “We find Code Ann. §3-
1102 to be an extremely harsh limitation in application because it has the effect, in many
cases, of cutting off rights before there is any knowledge of injury.”348 The Court in
Allrid nonetheless upheld the statute against constitutional attack stating that it bore a fair
and substantial relation to the object of legislation.349
In 1983, the Georgia Supreme Court ameliorated the harsh effects of the
malpractice limitations act as applied to actions for wrongful death. In Clark v. Singer, a
widow brought a suit for wrongful death based upon a physician’s failure to diagnose and
treat her husband’s lung cancer.350 The negligent act allegedly occurred prior to June 3,
1978; the plaintiff’s husband died on June 11, 1979; and the plaintiff filed suit on June 8,
1981, within two years of her husband’s death but more than two years from the alleged
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wrongful act or omission.351 The Court recognized that the statute of limitations created
two classes of wrongful death claimants in medical malpractice cases: “(1) those whose
spouse, child or parent died within two years of the negligent or wrongful act or
omission, and (2) those whose spouse, child or parent died more than two years after the
negligent or wrongful act or omission.”352 The Court, applying the rational relationship
test to the plaintiff’s equal protection challenge, held that the statute was unconstitutional
as applied to actions for wrongful death.353 The Court stated, “To impose a limitation
period which may be exhausted before the cause of action accrues (i.e., before the patient
dies), arbitrarily distinguishes between wrongful death, medical malpractice plaintiffs.”354
Relying on its decision in Clark v. Singer, the following year the Court held that a
plaintiff with a delayed injury was denied equal protection under the law by Georgia’s
existing medical malpractice statute of limitations.355 In Shessel v. Stroup, the plaintiff
alleged that her physician negligently performed a sterilization procedure on her resulting
in the birth of a child.356 The physician performed the procedure on April 3, 1978; the
plaintiff discovered her pregnancy on May 1, 1981; and she filed suit on November 16,
1982, more than four years after the alleged wrongful act.357 The Court held:
Just as a wrongful death action may not be brought until death occurs, a
personal injury claim may not be brought until there is injury. Therefore
we have the same arbitrary…classification held unconstitutional in Clark
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v. Singer…The medical malpractice statute begins to run from the date of
negligence, thereby classifying cases into one category where injury
occurs within the two-year period and another where injury occurs after…
We find no substantial relation in this…classification. All who are
similarly situated are not treated alike.358
Not surprisingly, in 1985 the Georgia General Assembly enacted a new statute in
response to the Georgia Court’s evisceration of its previous statute of limitations for
medical malpractice actions.
The new O.C.G.A. §9-3-71 subsection (a) required that a plaintiff bring a medical
malpractice action “within two years after the date on which an injury or death arising
from a negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred.”359 Subsection (b) of the statute
provided that “in no event may an action for medical malpractice be brought more than
five years after the date on which the negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred.”360
Thus, while the statute provided that the two-year limitations period could run from the
date of injury rather than from the negligent act, it set a five-year period of repose on
delayed or latent injuries that would run from the date of the negligent act as opposed to
the date of the injury.361 This statute of limitations and repose for medical malpractice
actions is still in effect today.
Although, the new 1985 statute of limitations returned to the pre-1976 “date of
injury” accrual point that plaintiff’s enjoyed under the general tort statute of limitations, it
still created a hardship on plaintiff’s with latent injuries. In a 1992 case, Stone v.
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Radiology Services, the Georgia Court of Appeals distinguished between latent and
delayed injuries.362 In Stone, the plaintiff, who had been suffering chronic headaches,
consulted defendant radiologists to evaluate a CAT scan of his brain.363 The defendants
noted no areas of abnormal density in the plaintiff’s brain.364 Three years later, the
plaintiff discovered through further testing that he suffered from a brain tumor requiring
surgical removal.365 The plaintiff citing to Whitaker v. Zirkle, asserted that his actual
injury was delayed from the date of misdiagnosis and occurred within the time limitations
period.366
In Whitaker, the plaintiff had a suspicious mole on her back evaluated by a
pathologist in 1978 who pronounced it benign.367 The plaintiff had no symptoms of
cancer until 1985.368  Reexamination of the original sample revealed malignant
melanoma.369 The plaintiff filed suit in 1986, one year from the diagnosis of cancer, but
eight years from the original misdiagnosis.370 The Court stated that the crux of the case
was when the plaintiff’s injury occurred.371 The Court held:
Plaintiffs do not allege the misdiagnosis caused Mrs. Zirkle to have
cancer; the basis of plaintiffs’ claims is that she had cancer all along.  The
injury complained of is the subsequent metastasis of cancerous cells which
remained at the site where the mole was removed…When an injury occurs
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subsequent to the date of medical treatment, the statute of limitation
commences from the date the injury is discovered.372
Thus, the Court in Whitaker described a delayed injury that occurred some time later than
the wrongful or negligent act which was the misdiagnosis of the plaintiff’s cancer.
Although the plaintiff in Stone asserted that his injury did not occur until his brain
tumor grew, the Court disagreed.373 It distinguished Whitaker holding that Mr. Stone’s
injury occurred at the point of misdiagnosis, rather than at a later point.374 The Court
held:
In most misdiagnosis cases, the injury begins immediately upon the
misdiagnosis due to the pain, suffering or economic loss sustained by the
patient from the time of the misdiagnosis until the medical problem is
properly diagnosed and treated. The misdiagnosis itself is the injury and
not the subsequent discovery of the proper diagnosis…Mr. Stone was
already suffering from the effects of the tumor at the time he was seen by
appellees. Thus, the misdiagnosis of Mr. Stone’s condition injured him by
allowing his pain and suffering to continue.375
The Stone Court distinguished between a delayed injury, such as the injury present in the
Whitaker case, and a latent injury such as was present in Mr. Stone’s case. A latent
injury, then would be one that is present, but not visible or known to the patient. Georgia,
unlike some other states, has never legislatively recognized a discovery rule for those
plaintiffs with latent injuries that could not, even with the exercise of reasonable
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diligence, discern their injury. However, Georgia Courts have at times interpreted the
accrual of statutes of limitation to favor plaintiffs.376 The only area where the Georgia
legislature recognizes a discovery rule for latent injuries is in tolling the statute of
limitations for the foreign object exception
Tolling the Statute of Limitations: The Foreign Object Exception
Under O.C.G.A. §9-3-72, the statute of limitations “…shall not apply where a
foreign object has been left in a patient’s body, but in such case an action shall be brought
within one year after the negligent or wrongful act or omission is discovered...”377 The
Georgia Supreme Court in Dalby v. Banks articulated the purpose of the foreign object
exception:
Where a physician places a foreign object in his patient’s body during
treatment, he has actual knowledge of its presence. His failure to remove it
goes beyond ordinary negligence so as to be classified by the legislature as
a continuing tort which tolls the statute of limitations until the object is
discovered. The purpose of the legislature in making a distinction between
the two types of medical malpractice was to allow the plaintiff’s claim
which does not rest on professional diagnostic judgment or discretion to
survive until actual discovery of the wrongdoing. In such situations the
danger of belated, false or frivolous claims is eliminated. The foreign
object in the patient’s body is directly traceable to the doctor’s
malfeasance.378
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The same issues that confront other state courts with respect to foreign object
cases also confront Georgia courts. For example, Georgia courts have been faced with
determining what constitutes a foreign object. Thus, they have determined that a dental
bridge and ceramic glass shards left in a hand are not foreign objects, while a misplaced
suture and a metal washer left in the leg from an internal fixation device are foreign
objects.379 In 1988, however, the Georgia Supreme Court faced a somewhat novel
defense in Ringewald v. Crawford Long Memorial Hospital.380
In Ringewald the plaintiff underwent quadruple bypass surgery and the surgeon
left a bulldog clamp in his chest.381 The surgeon discovered the clamp that same day and
the plaintiff required a second surgery for its removal which plaintiff claimed led to
complications.382 The plaintiff filed his claim within two days of the two-year statute of
limitations for medical malpractice actions, but the defendant asserted that the foreign
object exception applied and therefore, plaintiff had only one year within which to file
from the date the clamp was discovered.383 The Court held that “there is nothing
ambiguous about the statute’s requirement that the action must be brought within one
year of the discovery of a foreign object, regardless of whether this has the effect of
extending or diminishing the general limitation period for a medical malpractice
action.”384
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Two years later in 1990, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed itself and
overturned its decision in Ringewald.385 In Spivey v. Whiddon, a plaintiff underwent
surgery after an automobile accident.386 The surgeon applied internal fixation with a
metal screw and washer to hold the broken bones in her leg together so that they could
heal.387 Later the defendant surgeon removed the screw from the plaintiff’s leg, but did
not remove the washer.388 When the plaintiff continued to have pain she sought a second
opinion and discovered that the defendant surgeon left the washer in her leg necessitating
another surgery for its removal.389 The plaintiff filed suit less than two years from the
surgery when the defendant left the washer in her leg, but more than one year from the
date she discovered it had been left in her leg.390
The defendant, relying on the Court’s decision in Ringewald, asserted that the
plaintiff’s claim fell under the foreign object exception and therefore, she had only one
year from the discovery of the foreign object within which to bring suit.391 The Court
expressly overruled its decision in Ringewald stating that the foreign object exception
was enacted by the legislature to cure a perceived “mischief” which was “the injustice of
a claim being barred before its existence became known to the injured party.”392  The
Court held that the purpose of the statute was “curative” and that “the legislature never
intended the statute to shorten the time within which a cause of action may be
asserted.”393 Recently the Court of Appeals in Abend v. Klaudt, also held that as a matter
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of law the five-year statute of repose does not bar a foreign object medical malpractice
action timely filed within the one-year period dictated by the exception.394 Thus, the
Court recognized that exceptions which toll the statute of limitations are enacted to favor
the interests of certain plaintiffs in need of protection.
The Minors and Incompetents Exception
The Georgia General Assembly also recognized the need to protect minors and
incompetents from the sometimes harsh effects of the medical malpractice statute of
limitations. O.C.G.A. §9-3-73 provides:
…A minor who has not attained the age of five years shall have two years
from the date of such minor’s fifth birthday within which to bring a
medical malpractice action if the cause of action arose before such minor
attained the age of five years…in no event may an action for medical
malpractice be brought by or on behalf of a minor…(A) After the tenth
birthday of the minor if such minor was under the age of five years on the
date on which the negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred or (B)
after five years from the date on which the negligent or wrongful act or
omission occurred if such minor was age five or older on the date of such
act or omission.
The first portion of the statute provides for a statute of limitations for minors and the
second portion provides a statute of repose. Although the General Assembly was willing
to extend the time limitations for minors, they did not go so far as to encompass a
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discovery rule for minors. In Crowe v. Humana, the plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of the minor’s exception in Georgia.395
The plaintiffs brought their one-year-old child, Ashley, to the emergency room for
fever and seizures where the defendants treated her.396 Ashley sustained permanent brain
damage as a result of oxygen depravation.397 The plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of their
daughter approximately six and one half years from the date of the alleged malpractice,
but approximately one month from the date they discovered the defendants negligence.398
The Court declined to adopt an accrual date consistent with the discovery of the
defendant’s negligence, holding that the “cause of action arises on the date on which the
injury arising from the alleged negligence occurs.”399 The plaintiffs then asserted that the
statute violated their equal protection guarantees.400
They contended that the statute of limitations for minors creates one class of
plaintiffs whose disabilities end at five years of age and another class of plaintiffs under
O.C.G.A. §9-3-90, the general exception for minors for other causes of action whose
disabilities end upon reaching the age of majority.401  The Court held that the separate
classification for minors in medical malpractice cases was constitutional because it bore a
reasonable relationship to legitimate state objectives.402  These state objectives were
previously described in Smith v. Cobb-Kennestone Hosp. Authority as the tendency to
“prevent stale medical malpractice claims” and the tendency to “lower insurance and
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medical costs by decreasing the period in which health care providers and their insurers
would be exposed to suit.”403
Also, under O.C.G.A. §9-3-73, a person who is legally incompetent “because of
mental retardation or mental illness” cannot bring an action for medical malpractice
“more than five years after the date on which the negligent or wrongful act or omission
occurred.”404 Therefore, while the Georgia legislature carves out an exception from the
two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice for minors and mental
incompetents, it excludes them from the protection of O.C.G.A. §9-3-90 which allows
other causes of action to be tolled until the disability of the minor or mental incompetent
is lifted.405
The Fraud Exception
Like many other states Georgia also recognizes an exception for fraud.
O.C.G.A.§9-3-96 provides, “If the defendant or those under whom he claims are guilty of
a fraud by which the plaintiff has been debarred or deterred from bringing an action, the
period of limitations shall run only from the time of the plaintiff’s discovery of the
fraud.”406 Under Georgia law, “Actual fraud, through nondisclosure of a known injury by
the defendant and through acts to conceal the injury, which deters or debars the bringing
of the action, tolls the statute of limitation and tolls the running of the statute until
discovery of the fraud.”407 As the Court in Miller v. Kitchens stated:
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Fraud that will toll the statute of limitation requires: (1) actual fraud
involving moral turpitude on the part of the defendant; (2) the fraud must
conceal the cause of action from the plaintiff, thereby debarring or
deterring the knowing of the cause of action; and (3) the plaintiff must
have exercised reasonable diligence to discover the cause of action,
notwithstanding the failure to discover within the statute of limitation.408
However, in Lorentzson v. Rowell the Court stated, “…[C]oncealment of material facts
may in itself amount to fraud when direct inquiry is made and the truth evaded.”409 The
Court noted that the relationship between a doctor and patient embodies trust and
confidence and where a confidential relationship exists between a patient and doctor
“there is no requirement that actual fraud be shown in order to come within the purview
of  O.C.G.A. §9-3-96.”410
In Hill v. Fordham, a plaintiff visited his dentist because of a toothache.411 He
authorized the dentist to extract five of his bottom teeth in order to be fitted for bottom
dentures.412 Although the defendant dentist noted that the plaintiff had an impacted
wisdom tooth in his lower jaw that he thought “may erupt later,” the plaintiff asserted  the
defendant never informed him of the tooth.413 Over approximately three months after
being fitted with dentures, the plaintiff complained of pain, but the defendant told the
plaintiff that his pain was caused by bone slivers which normally took time to work their
way out of the gum.414 The plaintiff did not pursue the cause of his pain until four and a
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half years later when a second dentist diagnosed an erupted and abscessed wisdom
tooth.415 The plaintiff brought suit five years and four months after he last saw the
defendant.416 The plaintiff appealed from a lower court decision granting the defendant
summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff’s action was barred by the medical
malpractice statute of limitations and statute of repose.417
After reviewing the facts, the Court stated, “In this case there is evidence the
defendant knew of the existence of the wisdom tooth, the condition which allegedly
caused plaintiff’s pain and discomfort.”418 The Court acknowledging the plaintiff’s claim
that the defendant failed to inform him of the tooth and that he relied on the defendant’s
statements that his condition would eventually resolve itself stated, “A patient has the
right to believe what he is told by his medical doctors about his condition.”419 The Court
went on to hold that whether or not the statute was tolled by fraud was an issue for the
trier of fact.420 Regarding the defendant’s assertion that in any case the plaintiff’s cause
of action was barred by the statute of repose, the Court responded:
The statute of ultimate repose should not be applied to relieve a defendant
of liability for injuries which occurred during the period of liability, but
which were concealed from the patient by the defendant’s own fraud.  The
statute of ultimate repose should not provide an incentive for a doctor or
other medical professional to conceal his or her negligence with the
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assurance that after five years such fraudulent conduct will insulate him or
her from liability. The sun never sets on fraud.421
The Continuing Treatment Exception
Historically, Georgia’s Courts have steadfastly refused to recognize a continuing
treatment doctrine. That position has recently undergone a significant challenge. In a
1993 case, Vitner v. Miller, the Court came closest at that time to recognizing a
continuing treatment rule without actually adopting one.422 In Vitner, the defendant
performed an abortion on the plaintiff on March 11, 1989.423 She retained the products of
conception and experienced pain and bleeding so the defendant performed a second
abortion on March 15, 1989.424 Again, the plaintiff retained the products of conception
and finally, she consulted another physician who performed a third procedure on March
20, 1989.425 The plaintiff filed suit for medical malpractice on March 18, 1991 alleging
negligent performance of an abortion.426
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the third abortion “was part of the course
of treatment which resulted from appellant’s failure to remove all of the products of
conception in performing the abortion on appellee and was not the injury to the
appellee.”427 Chief Judge Pope, in his concurrence, urged his fellow judges to adopt the
continuous treatment doctrine stating:
This court should seize the opportunity presented by this case to adopt the
doctrine of ‘continuous treatment’ in medical malpractice cases…There
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are several bases for the rationale underlying this doctrine: (1) a patient
should properly place trust and confidence in his physician and should be
excused from challenging the quality of care being rendered him until that
confidential relationship terminates; (2) to require a patient to bring suit
against his physician before treatment is terminated would conceivably
afford the physician a defense that the patient left before treatment was
terminated and before the physician had a chance to effectuate a proper
result; and (3) the treating physician is in the best position to identify and
correct the malpractice.428
The Court of Appeals, however, declined to adopt the continuous treatment doctrine at
Judge Pope’s urging.429
In 1995, the Court of Appeals expressly declined to apply the continuous tort
theory in Ford v. Dove.430  In Ford, the plaintiff complained that his primary care
physician failed to follow up on a urinalysis that revealed blood in his urine and to
perform an x-ray to rule out kidney cancer.431 The plaintiff filed suit more than two years
after the symptoms of kidney cancer were manifested.432 The Court expressly held:
We decline to apply the continuous tort theory in this case so as, in
essence, to extend the date when the statute of limitation…would
commence to run; application of such a theory would appear to thwart the
intent of the legislature in amending [the statute of limitations] in 1985.
We further decline to adopt any theory of ‘continuous treatment’ as a
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vehicle for judicially legislating a change to the applicable statute of
limitation.433
The Court again rejected a plaintiff’s invitation to apply a continuous treatment doctrine
in Crawford v. Spencer.434
In Crawford, the plaintiff’s primary care physician continued to prescribe a
medication that was contraindicated for patients with ulcers, even though the plaintiff
was definitively diagnosed with peptic ulcer.435 The plaintiff filed suit more than two
years beyond the date the injury was suffered, but less than two years beyond the date
that he was last treated by the defendant physician.436 After rejecting the plaintiff’s
contention that his case fell within a continuing tort theory, the Court held:
We also reject appellant’s enticement of this court to expand substantially
the period of limitation in medical malpractice cases of this nature by
adopting a theory of  ‘continuous treatment.’ Although the opportunity to
do so was presented, the continuing treatment theory was not adopted by a
majority of the judges of this court in Vitner v. Miller.437
After repeated invitations by plaintiffs to the Court of Appeals to apply the
continuous treatment doctrine, the Appellate Court recently adopted the doctrine in
Williams v. Young.438  In Williams, a diabetic patient first sought care from the defendant
doctor on September 29, 1995 complaining of swelling and pain in her left ankle and
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foot.439 The plaintiff went to see the defendant doctor repeatedly for the same condition
until September 30, 1996.440 Finally, on November 4, 1996, after seeking a second
opinion the plaintiff discovered that she had a dislocation of the talonavicular joint in her
foot.441 The plaintiff underwent surgery for repair of her foot on December 10, 1996,
although the long-term prognosis for her foot was poor.442 The plaintiff filed suit on
October 28, 1998 arguing that telephone consultations with the defendant doctor and his
continued course of treatment extended beyond October 28, 1996 and thus, her complaint
was timely filed.443
The Court of Appeals described the harsh effect that can occur when symptoms of
an injury manifest themselves to a plaintiff at or before misdiagnosis, but a plaintiff does
not become aware until later that the diagnosis was incorrect.444 The Court, thus
describing a classic latent injury case held:
Williams urges us to read the statute of limitation expansively by holding
that the alleged negligence continues, for purposes of calculating the
running of the statute, as long as the plaintiff remains in ‘continuous
treatment.’ Although in the past this court has declined to adopt this
doctrine…we conclude that the better course is to adopt the doctrine in
appropriate medical malpractice cases alleging misdiagnosis.445
The Appellate Court citing to an Arkansas case, went on to describe its new rule for
continuing course of treatment cases stating:
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If the treatment by the doctor is a continuing course and the patient’s
illness, injury or condition is of such a nature as to impose on the doctor a
duty of continuous treatment and care, the statute does not commence
running until treatment by the doctor for the disease or condition has
terminated – unless during the treatment the patient learns or should learn
of negligence, in which case the statute runs from the time of discovery,
actual or constructive.446
In support of adopting the continuous treatment doctrine the Court used verbatim the
same rationale that was suggested by Judge Pope in Vitner v. Miller in 1993.447 The Court
additionally expressly held that the statute of repose would not be tolled for the
continuous treatment doctrine and therefore, still provided a five-year outside limit on
such medical malpractice cases.448
 Judge Andrews in his dissent asserted that the adoption of the continuous
treatment doctrine is contrary to the doctrine of stare decisis and “goes beyond the limits
of judicial restraint and into the area of unauthorized judicial legislation.”449 He pointed
to the only Georgia Supreme Court case that previously touched on this issue, Hunter,
MacLean, Exley & Dunn v. Frame.450 There, the Supreme Court declined to apply a
“continuing representation rule” in a legal malpractice case citing to previous medical
malpractice cases that declined to apply the continuous treatment doctrine.451
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Finally, on March 11, 2002, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals in Young v. Williams.452  It declined to expand the exceptions to the statute of
limitations to include the continuing treatment doctrine, holding:
Prescribing periods of limitation is a legislative, not a judicial
function…The legislatively prescribed statute of limitation does not
provide for the commencement of the period of limitation upon the
termination of the health-care provider’s treatment of the patient, and the
judicial branch is not empowered to engraft such a provision on to what
the legislature has enacted.453
In his concurrence, Justice Carley suggested that the “recognition of the ‘continuous
treatment’ theory in medical malpractice cases certainly has much to commend it.”454 He
noted that the Court was constrained, however, by the doctrines of stare decisis and
separation of powers.455  He added that the Court awaited “legislative response.”456
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
Given the General Assembly’s historically pro-defendant stance, Justice Carley
may be waiting a long time for legislative response.457 Georgia has traditionally favored
health care providers and insurance companies over injured plaintiffs in its time
limitations law for medical malpractice cases. As noted previously, the General
Assembly has never recognized a discovery rule for plaintiffs except in the context of the
foreign object exception to the statute of limitations. This policy often leads to harsh
effects on plaintiffs who have latent injuries and are unable to discover the defendant’s
negligence until after the statute of limitations has run.
When the Georgia General Assembly first altered the medical malpractice statute
of limitations from an injury based to a wrongful occurrence based statute, it did so in
response to the perceived insurance crisis of the 1970s. Many scholars, however, dispute
that an actual insurance crisis occurred in either the 1970s or the 1980s.458 The increase in
premiums may have been the result of factors unrelated to the increase in either the
severity or frequency of claims.459 Thus, legislative justification for tort reform that
clearly favors defendants may be based on an uncertain foundation. If tort reform does
not affect the rise in insurance premiums, then extinguishing plaintiff’s valid claims due
to harshly restrictive time limitations appears unjust. Yet, there are other valid purposes
for the imposition of time limitations. Evidence degrades or is lost over time, witnesses
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become unavailable and memories dim.460 Some certainty of repose is necessary for
peace of mind and to conduct unencumbered business transactions.461 These purposes are
not without significant merit in our justice system.
Georgia courts have attempted to ameliorate the harsh effects of the statutes
enacted by the General Assembly. The Court struck down the negligent occurrence based
statute of limitations in Shessel v. Stroup.462 And in Whitaker v. Zirkle it recognized that
misdiagnosis can result in delayed injury, extending the point of accrual to favor
plaintiffs in such cases.463 Most recently, the Court of Appeals attempted to adopt the
continuous treatment doctrine in Williams v. Young.464 Although rejected by the Georgia
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals attempt to adopt the continuous treatment doctrine
represents awareness by the Georgia judiciary that plaintiffs need relief from the effects
of Georgia’s statute of limitations. Attempts to circumvent the statute demonstrate a
dynamic tension between the Court’s constitutional mandate to comply with separation of
powers and fundamental concepts of justice and fairness. If the legislature achieved an
appropriate balance when it enacted the statutes of limitation and repose between
plaintiffs and defendants, the Georgia judiciary has apparently been the last to know.
A balanced approach in Georgia might include the Assembly’s recognition of a
discovery rule within the statute of limitations, but the imposition of a fixed statute of
repose which would provide an absolute bar to plaintiffs’ claims. Many states have
enacted statutes of limitations that contain discovery rules, yet have set outside limits in
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the form of statutes of repose beyond which plaintiff’s claims are barred.465 By
embracing a discovery rule within Georgia’s statute of limitations, the legislature would
recognize those plaintiff’s whose injuries are either delayed or latent assuring their day in
court.
The statute of limitations should begin running from the date the plaintiff knew or
should have known with the exercise of reasonable diligence that he has suffered an
injury due to the defendant’s negligent action. The Assembly should allow two years
from the date of discovery for the plaintiff to bring suit in view of the particular Georgia
requirement that plaintiffs obtain the affidavit of a medical expert prior to filing suit.466
The affidavit requirement imposes an additional burden on plaintiffs to gather all
pertinent medical files, locate and hire a medical expert, and obtain a sworn affidavit
prior to filing a claim.467 Thus a two-year statute from the date of discovery would be
necessary at minimum.
However, by retaining an absolute statute of repose, such as Georgia’s existing
five-year statute, the legislature would address the interests of defendants and promote
the viability of memory and evidence. The legislature should place a five-year absolute
outside limit on such suits. By imposing an absolute statute of repose defendants and
insurance companies would not suffer from the uncertainty of future claims. The long tail
of medical malpractice suits would be effectively docked. The only exceptions to the
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five-year statute of repose should be the foreign object exception and the fraud exception.
The foreign object exception should toll the statute of repose because the evidence of the
physician’s malfeasance does not degrade. Memory is unnecessary because the foreign
object speaks for itself.  Fraud should toll the statute of repose because as Judge Pope
noted in Hill v. Fordham, “The sun never sets on fraud.”468 Such a time limitations
scheme addresses both the plaintiff’s need for justice and compensation and the
defendant’s need for certainty and repose.
As medical malpractice plaintiffs are not a well-organized, well-funded interest
group, their only hope in changing Georgia’s time limitations law lies with the Georgia
Trial Lawyers Association and the American Trial Lawyers Association. These
organizations could act to influence the legislature for change. Until such change occurs,
however, Georgia’s medical malpractice victims will continue to be disadvantaged by an
imbalance of interests.
As of the writing of this paper, U.S.A. Today, reported a story of hundreds of
doctors in Edinburg, Texas protesting their skyrocketing medical malpractice
premiums.469 Physicians again are calling for tort reform.470 In Nevada, the Governor
announced that the state would set up an insurance association to help those physicians
who could not get malpractice insurance from the licensed market.471 The Nevada Trial
Lawyers, responding to blame for the rising cost of malpractice insurance pointed a
finger at St. Paul stating, “They created the problem, they exacerbated the problem by
writing policies for bad doctors, and then, when the consequences of their actions became
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known, they leave the market and the physicians holding the bag.”472 The Nevada trial
lawyers association insists there is no correlation between jury awards and malpractice
insurance rates.473 Balancing the interests between the two parties remains as ubiquitous a
problem throughout the United States as it was decades ago. Until the true source or
sources of rising insurance rates is ascertained and effectively managed, both plaintiffs
and health care professionals will continue to suffer the consequences.
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